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1. Introduction
This report combines all reports of the project Chain of Safety. During 
the projectperiod has been concluded that all actions were so related 
that a combined report gives better assurance that future initiatives 
will start from the output of our project than four different reports.
The project was carried out under the Interreg IIIB-programme. The 
Interreg IIIB North Sea Programme emphasizes transnationality and 
cross-sectorality as important principles, elements which feature 
strongly in the Chain of Safety project. Transnationality includes 
cross-border approach, but is about cooperation between countries 
that are not necessarily direct neighbours.
The aim of the project was to facilitate cooperation, exchange of 
experience and mutual assistance between North Sea Regions in the 
event of coastal flooding. The overall objective of the project was to 
initiate a contingency plan for flooding covering the whole North Sea 
Area. This would be in cooperation with all relevant stakeholders, in 
order to combine best practices and experiences. Furthermore, a 
network of stakeholders in the North Sea Region was established 
in order to implement the contingency plan during the programme 
period 2007-2013. 
The project followed the EU Floods Directive (2007/60/EC) and 
assumed the EU-coordination by the EU Monitoring and Information 
Centre (MIC) is the way to organise international assistance during a 
crisis, when there is no possibility to assist directly bilateral.
The lead partner of the project was the Province of Zeeland (the 
Netherlands). Other partners were the Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (the Netherlands), the Ministry of the 
Interior and Kingdom Relations (the Netherlands), the Essex County 
Council (UK), the Danish Coastal Authority (Denmark), the Ministry of 
the Interior of the Land Schleswig-Holstein (Germany) and the Flemish 
Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Belgium).
Sub-partners of Chain of Safety were the Province of East-Flanders 
(Belgium), the Province of West-Flanders (Belgium) and the Municipality 
of Schouwen-Duiveland (the Netherlands). An associated partner of 
Chain of Safety was the Province of Antwerp (Belgium).
The project consisted of the following actions, which are described 
in this report:
•  Action 1: A comprehensive analysis of the existing local, regional 
and national flood plans in the North Sea Regions
•  Action 2: Defining a contingency plan for flooding for the North Sea 
Region based on a common approach towards the Chain of Safety 
in the North Sea Area
•  Action 3: Inventory into the research to implement the chain of 
safety and of the available equipment for implementing the chain of 
safety for the North Sea Region into practise
•  Action 4: Dutch-Belgian coastal regions example to be utilised for 
further implementation
1.1  Development of this 
document
The content of the Chain of Safety project was linked or related to 
several other projects within the North Sea Programme, such as 
ESCAPE, FLOWS, FRaME, ComCoast, Safecoast, but also to projects 
in other INTERREG-Programmes, i.e. NOAH in the NWE-Programme 
and AWARE in the INTERREG IIIc West Zone-Programme, and Nazorg 
(‘Aftercare’) in the IIIa-Scheldemond Programme. The results of this 
project can also be used in the Baltic Sea Region and other INTERREG 
programmes.
The main difference of the project Chain of Safety in comparison to 
the other  projects under INTERREG IIIB is that this project focused 
on crisis management, whereas the other projects dealt with risk 
management. Therefore Chain of Safety was complementary to those 
projects.
Chain of Safety was partly built on the results and outcomes of the 
ESCAPE-project, in particular on action 1 of this project. Within ESCAPE 
necessary content, requirements, and conditions for contingency 
plans have been formulated. Since disasters and flooding do not 
stop at regional or national borders , more then one region or even 
more then one country will be involved. Realising this should be the 
reason for defining and implementing a common contingency plan for 
flooding based on the chain of safety methodology.
By bringing together all knowledge and experience on coastal 
flooding within the whole safety chain throughout the North Sea 
Region, we aimed at optimalisation of cooperation amongst those 
regions. We hope and expect this report will also provide efficient 
and well organized sharing of equipment, recourses, knowledge 
and experiences.
Within the Dutch-Belgian coastal region the results of actions1-3 
were compared to the existing situations. This resulted in an 
example on how to deal with the NSR contingency plan for coastal 
flooding.
The Flemish Dutch case demonstrates the interdependence in a 
low lying area vulnerable for coastal flooding as this part of the 
Scheldt estuary represents. In this situation common contingency 
planning and execution is of mayor importance for surviving such 
extreme events together. The pilot coastal contingency plan will 
serve as a step and learning exercise towards future North Sea 
contingency planning in cross-bordering areas.
The structure of the project was that all partners were  involved 
in all activities of the project. The activities were carried out in all 
participating regions.
The hosting for meetings of the Steering Committee and the 
working committees rotated amongst the participating regions, 
thus aiming for embedding the project in the partner regions and 
organisations at the best possible way. Besides the involvement 
of the partners, also relevant stakeholders such as emergency 
services were involved in the project’s meetings, workshops and 
conferences.
The project ran from April 2006 till July 2008. After a starting meeting 
the organisational structure was agreed with a steering committee 
and working committees. Workshops were organised with experts 
in the field of making contingencyplans, organizing assistance, and 
knowledge-exchange.
For the communication about the project a website was launched, 
which will stay in the air after the projectperiod: 
www.chainofsafety.com
Also four newsletters were published and distributed widely in the 
North Sea Region.
During the projectperiod contacts grew with the Interreg IIIb-projects 
ComCoast and Safecoast. A mutual DVD was made together:
Safecoast studied the changing risk of flooding and erosion and 
looked at general strategies to adapt to climate change.
Comcoast came up with new ideas and showed practical solutions of 
how to reorganize stretches of our coastal zone.
Chain of Safety has focused on what to do when all is not enough, 
and how to cope during and after a flood event, even across our 
administrative borders.
Together with Safecoast the final conference was organised and held 
in May 2008 in Scheveningen, The Netherlands.
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2. Scope
2.1 Scenario and Flooding 
Maps for Evacuation 
Planning 
Storm surges represent a major natural hazard in the North Sea 
region. Around 40,000 km_ of low-lying land at coastal flood risk 
in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the UK are at 
risk for flooding from sea. If during a major storm the flood defence 
measures cannot resist the pressure of a storm, large areas are 
flooded.
To make good preparation on flood disasters, it is important to 
get insight in the potential scale of a coastal flooding. The memo 
‘Flooding Maps for Evacuation Planning’ in appendix 2 presents the 
threatened areas of a ‘worst credible flood’ in the North Sea Region. 
A ‘worst credible flood’ is defined as “a flood, which occurs during 
a very extreme storm, however still possible situation”. Contingency 
planners can base their preparations on these ‘worst credible flood’ 
scenarios.
In the framework of the Dutch “National Strategy for High Water and 
Storm Surge Crisis” flood defence experts have developed the ‘worst 
credible flood’ scenarios and translated them to zones in which 
different areas maybe flooded simultaneously. The scenarios are 
based on situations that exceed the level of protection. These storm 
surges occur with wind speeds of 12 Bft or more. The duration of 
storm surges depends on the tide and the duration of the storm. 
In these scenarios the duration is set on 45 hours. The average 
prediction time is 15 hours.
Based on these insights and on historical data of storms occurred in 
the past, a qualitative extrapolation into the North Sea has been made 
(See figure 2). It has been assumed that the location of simultaneous 
flooded areas along the North Sea depends on the wind pattern 
direction of the storm: NW storms threaten the Dutch coast (III), N 
storms threaten the German bight and North Holland (IV) and when a 
N storm runs more to the southern part of the North Sea, 
Southeast England, Belgium, South West Holland are threatened (II). 
N storms threaten the Southeast coast of the United Kingdom (I) and 
a W storm will threaten the coast of the Germany and Denmark (V). 
But of course during a storm winds can change rapidly. More than 
one of the described areas can be effected then.
Three areas were chosen for a case study. The Belgium-Dutch coastal 
border zone  was chosen as the site for the case study (II or III). 
Breaches were supposed near Knokke (B) and Cadzand (NL). The 
flooded areas were defined using a Mike21 flooding model, which 
was set up in the framework of the Comrisk project. 
For Denmark the area around the town of Ribe was chosen as the 
site for the case study (V). A breach was made in the dike around the 
location of the Ribe Sluice, which is a weak point in the sea defence. 
The additional flooding caused by the closing of the sluices is not 
taken into account; this would cause an additional water-volume of 
around 6 Million m3 (Comrisk sp7).
For Germany the area around the mouth of the river Elbe was chosen 
as the site for the case study (IV or V). A breach was made in the 
dike around the division between Kemper Marsch and Wilstermarsch, 
at an area where the hinterland was relatively low. Because of the 
rough elevation model used for the calculation of the predicted water 
volumes no differences in the flooded area are visible in the different 
timesteps.
For the United Kingdom there was no elevation data available during 
the time of writing. Due to this no flooding maps could be made.
1.2 The chain of safety 
principle
Since flooding disasters do not stop at local, regional or even 
national borders, and neither do the effects of such disasters, 
transnational cooperation in contingency planning is very important. 
Although the actual approaches are comparable, different structures 
and cultural differences make that interregional cooperation on pro-
action, prevention, preparation, response and recovery, i.e. the chain 
of safety is not always uniform. The European member states and 
the European Commission are developing initiatives and strategies 
covering the whole of the chain of safety. National and regional 
regulations and operational programmes will have to be amended by 
the outcomes of these European developments. 
The concept of the chain of safety approach is embraced by the 
partners and recently also in the new EU Floods Directive (2007/60/
EC). One of the objectives of the Chain of Safety project was to provide 
input and recommendations to the European discussion regarding this 
field, by exchanging knowledge and experience available within the 
partnership, which includes both national and regional authorities. 
Dutch safety and security policy is based on what is referred to as 
the chain of safety, a schematic representation of all the activities 
focused on the promotion of safety and applicable to all sub-areas 
within safety policy. In practice the chain of safety can be approached 
from an operational point of view as well as from an administrative 
point of view. A distinction is usually made between five links: pro-
action, prevention, preparation, response and recovery. 
 
Figure 1. The chain of safety.
The chain of safety has several links. These links differ from each 
other in their time scope (from long term prevention to medium-term 
recovery) and aim. Five different links can be distinguished:
 
• Pro-action: the elimination of structural causes of danger, thereby 
preventing the development of dangerous situations.
• Prevention: the minimization of risks and the restriction of the 
consequences of
any accidents that occur.
• Preparation: the preparations for the control of accidents, 
disasters and crises.
• Response: the operational control of dangerous situations that 
have occurred,
including the provision of the necessary assistance.
•  Recovery: the concluding link in the safety chain. Recovery focuses 
on the return to the normal situation, together with evaluations that 
result in procedural improvements.
1.3  Outline of the Report
After this introductory chapter part 2 will set forth the scope of the 
main products of the Chain of Safety project. It comprises flooding 
maps of several coastal regions in the North Sea Region. Furthermore, 
the existing framework of European Union (EU) Crisis Coordination 
Arrangements will be sketched out in order to gain a clear picture 
into the European legislative framework and base for transnational 
cooperation concerning flood management. The last part of the 
scope is about a checklist we came up to for the recovery-phase.
Part three describes the products of the project. An inventory 
scheme of capacities and capabilities of the various partners in the 
field of flood risk-management and relief, our study on the available 
equipment, the organizational outline of scaling up-schemes of the 
partners and their respective inventory systems of equipment and 
a summary of the pilot project on a cross border coastal flooding-
scenario set in Zeeland and West-Flanders. The final product is about 
the combination of knowledge related to crisismanagement in a 
coastal flood scenario, and the ambition to centralise this knowledge 
in the near future. 
Finally, part 4 ends with conclusions from the report and initial 
recommendations regarding the follow-up to the Chain of Safety 
project.
This report will be published on the project website www.chainofsafety.
com.
Figure 1. The chain of safety.
The chain of safety has several links. These links differ from each other in their time 
scope (from long term prevention to medium-term recovery) and aim. Five different 
links can be distinguished: 
Pro-action: the elimination of structural causes of danger, thereby preventing the 
development of dangerous situations. 
Prevention: the minimization of risks and the restriction of the consequences of 
any accidents that occur. 
Preparation: the preparations for the control of accidents, disasters and crises. 
Response: the operational control of dangerous situations that have occurred, 
including the provision of the necessary assistance. 
Recovery: the concluding link in the safety chain. Recovery focuses on the return 
to the normal situation, together with evaluations that result in procedural 
improvements.
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Crisis Coordination Arrangements will be sketched out in order to gain a clear picture 
into the European legislative framework and base for transnational cooperation 
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and capabilities of the various partners in the field of flood risk-management and 
relief, our study on the available equipment, the organizational outline of scaling up-
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2.2 
EU Crisis Management and 
Coordination Arrangements
2.2.1 EU Crisis Coordination 
Arrangements (CCA)
The manual on EU emergency and crisis coordination arrangements 
was submitted to the Council in June 2006 as a response to the 
request by the European Council (The Hague Programme, point 2.4,) 
to set up an integrated EU arrangement for crisis management with 
cross-border effects. It is considered to be a living document which 
requires permanent updating and adjustment by the Presidency and 
General Secretariat of the Council.
This manual is based throughout on the key principle of subsidiarity 
- Member States have primary responsibility for the management of 
crises within their territory. It does not impose any obligations, nor 
does it change existing competences. Equally, the manual seeks to 
recognise the value of mutual support provided between Member 
States in a spirit of solidarity in the response to emergencies of a 
significant scale.
In the context of this manual, the notion of crisis management 
encompasses a wide range of sectors including civil protection, 
law enforcement, public order and the private sector. The manual 
is cross pillar and relevant both to external crises and crises within 
the EU and aims to assist Member States during emergencies. It is 
without prejudice to existing Crisis Management Procedures for the 
handling of crisis situations in the context of the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (Title V of the Treaty of the EU).
A few of the most severe emergencies or crisis are of such wide-
ranging impact or political significance that they require a coordinated 
EU response on a political level. 
These emergencies/crisis are covered through the EU emergency 
and crisis coordination arrangements (CCA), setting out how the EU 
Institutions and affected Member States interact in Brussels in a 
crisis mode. 
Procedures within the CCA.
The flow chart in figure 3 is a summary depiction of information flows 
and alternative actions to be taken by the affected Member State 
depending on the impact of the breaking emergency/crisis. 
In an emergency/crisis the affected Member State will evaluate 
whether the response can be handled without the support from other 
countries or the EU institutions. 
o  If yes, all response actions are taken solely at national level without 
relying on assistance from other countries or the EU. The affected 
Member State might however - depending on the scale of the 
emergency/crisis - inform the specific Rapid Alert System (RAS) of 
the Commission (e.g. MIC).
o  If no, the Member State will evaluate whether the emergency/crisis 
is of such an impact that
 • no political EU level coordination is required:
In this case the affected Member State will either
- alert the specific RAS (e.g. MIC) and/or 
- trigger bi- and multilateral agreements and/or
- consult the default contact details of the manual.
 • political EU level coordination is required:
In this case, the information will be conveyed to the SitCen 
immediately. 
The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) from EU is the contact 
for the national coordination centres to organize mutual assistance 
between countries, as far as no bilateral agreements make this 
possible directly.
Information on any breaking emergency or crisis shall be conveyed 
immediately to the General Secretariat of the Council (SITCEN). The 
SITCEN is operational 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The SITCEN 
duty number is +322-281-5000.
The Director of the Sitcen or his designated replacement shall 
immediately relay the information to the Presidency (duty officer in the 
Permanent Representation), the Directors of the Private Office of the 
Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General of the Council and 
to the Commission (ARGUS - duty service number +322-292-2222).
The Permanent Representative of the Presidency (or his or her 
designated replacement) will confer with the Council Secretariat 
(Deputy Secretary-General or designated replacement) and the 
Commission (Secretary-General or designated replacement), as 
well as with the Permanent Representatives of any directly affected 
Member States, to determine whether an emergency or crisis has 
occurred or is anticipated which warrants triggering the crisis 
coordination arrangements.  The decision on whether to activate them 
will be taken by the Presidency, in agreement with the Member States 
directly affected, and be based on expert judgement, in particular 
on whether the interests of several Member States are engaged in 
conjunction with those of the EU institutions.
If the Presidency (Permanent Representative) decides to convene 
a Crisis Steering Group, the Council Secretariat (SITCEN) and the 
Commission shall immediately be informed of the time and venue of 
the meeting and the Member States to be invited.
If the Presidency (Permanent Representative) concludes that the 
arrangements need not be activated at that juncture, he or she shall 
inform the Council Secretariat, the Commission and Member States 
consulted.
The Council Secretariat (SITCEN) will convene the principal members 
of the Crisis Steering Group. It will send a message to the duty 
officers of all Permanent Representations informing them that a 
meeting of the Steering Group has been convened. Duty officers in 
the Permanent Representations will also serve as a point of contact 
should any information be requested from that Member State by the 
Crisis Steering Group.
Crisis
breaks
Is Member State 
able to handle crisis
without external help?
Yes No
MS evaluates
No political
EU coordination
required
Political EU 
coordination
required
SitCen
CCA
RAS
Agree-
ments Manual 
Info
National action
Figure 3. Procedure in the event of a breaking emergency or crisis when political 
coordination is required. 
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Figure 4. Political coordination in Brussels in the event of a breaking emergency or crisis. 
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Figure 4. Political coordination in Brussels in the event of a breaking 
emergency or crisis.
2.2.2 EU Crisis Management 
Arrangements 
It is important to note the existence of continuously developing forms 
of transnational cooperation at EU level. For the purposes of the 
Chain of Safety-project, there are elements in EU civil protection 
cooperation that form a useful backbone for future cooperation 
concerning coastal floodings in the North Sea Region.
The EU’s Crisis Management Arrangements focus on three links in the 
chain of safety: prevention, preparation and response. The European 
Commission is responsible for supporting and supplementing efforts 
at national, regional and local level with regard to disaster prevention, 
the preparedness of those responsible for civil protection and the 
intervention in the event of disaster. 
The Commission focusses its efforts on information, as correct 
information dissemination and sharing is essential for cooperation 
to work effectively. This entails collecting and pooling information on 
national civil protection capabilities. 
EU cooperation also calls for the rapid mobilisation of intervention 
teams, experts and other resources on request in the event of major 
emergencies in order to alleviate the effects of a disasters during 
the first days. The Commission is entrusted to facilitate this as well 
to offer technical support, including satellite images if these are 
required. 
After emergency relief operations are over, work starts on further 
information-sharing. In the case of major operations, the Commission 
organises lessons-learnt sessions which greatly contribute to 
identifying best-practice  in preparation for other emergencies. In the 
recovery phase, the Commission also grants financial assistance to 
the affected state via a Solidarity Fund. 
The legislative framework
The legislative framework for European civil protection enabled the 
Commission to establish a framework for effective and rapid co-
operation between national civil protection services when mutual 
assistance is needed. The following tools for civil protection have 
been created at EU level:
1. The Community Action Programme, which supports major 
projects, workshops and training courses in the field of prevention, 
preparedness and response to natural disasters both at land and at 
sea.
2. The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection involves the 
participation of 30 European states which pool their civil protection 
resources that can be made available to disaster-stricken countries.
In 2005, the Commission adopted a Proposal for a Council Regulation 
establishing a Rapid Response and Preparedness Instrument for major 
emergencies. This proposal provides the future legal framework for 
the financing of civil protection operations. The Commission proposes 
a major increase in the future financing for European civil protection 
actions, with annual amounts ranging from €16 million in 2007 to €30 
million in 2013. This proposal was adopted in March 2007 as Council 
Decision 2007/162/EC establishing a Civil Protection Financial 
Instrument.
The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection
The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection was established by 
Council Decision 2001/792/EC. It was subsequently operationalized 
by Commission Decision 2004/277/EC, which laid down the rules 
for the implementation of the Community Mechanism, defining its 
duties and the functioning of the various tools made use of in the 
Mechanism. When natural or manmade disasters strike a country, 
both inside and outside the European Union, it is possible to mobilise 
the necessary operational resources to assist and provide prompt 
response. The Mechanism was recast by a Council Decision of June 
2007.
The main role of the Community Mechanism for Civil Protection is to 
facilitate co-operation in civil protection assistance interventions in 
the event of major emergencies which may require urgent response 
actions. This applies also to situations where there may be an 
imminent threat of such major emergencies.
In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, it can provide added-
value to European civil protection assistance by making support 
available on request of the affected country. This may arise if the 
affected country’s preparedness for a disaster is not sufficient to 
provide an adequate response in terms of available resources. By 
pooling the civil protection capabilities of the participating states, the 
Community Mechanism can ensure even better protection primarily 
of people, but also of the natural and cultural environment as well as 
property.
Monitoring and Information Centre
The Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) is the operational heart 
of the Community Mechanism. It is operated by Directorate-General 
Environment of the European Commission and accessible 24 hours 
a day. It gives countries access to a platform, to a one-stop-shop 
of civil protection means available amongst the all the participating 
states. Any country inside or outside the Union affected by a major 
disaster can make an appeal for assistance through the MIC. It acts 
10 11
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as a communication hub at headquarters level between participating 
states, the affected country and despatched field experts. It also 
provides useful and updated information on the actual status of an 
ongoing emergency. Last but not least, the MIC plays a co-ordination 
role by matching offers of assistance put forward by participating 
states to the needs of the disaster-stricken country.
The Community Mechanism for Civil Protection can be activated 
through the MIC by any participating state seeking prompt international 
assistance following a major disaster. A state usually calls on the 
Mechanism when the effects of the disaster cannot be matched by 
its own civil protection resources. 
As soon as the MIC receives a request for assistance, the Centre 
immediately forwards it to its 24-hour network of national contact 
points. These contact points represent the participating states’ civil 
protection authorities. They assess their available resources and 
inform the MIC whether or not they are in a position to help. The 
MIC then matches the offers made to the needs and informs the 
requesting state of the type and quantity of available assistance from 
the Community. 
Arrangements for the dispatch of the accepted assistance (delivery, 
transport, visa requirements, customs, etc.) are made directly 
between the offering and requesting states. If required, the MIC may 
play a facilitating role. Any intervention teams or assistance sent 
from the EU to a disaster area remains under the direction of the 
national authorities of the affected country, which has the right to 
ask European teams to stand down at any time. European teams are 
subject to local law and should operate in conformity with national 
rules and procedures governing their work.
To facilitate the technical co-ordination of European civil protection 
assistance a small team of experts can be despatched on site by 
the MIC. This team will ensure effective liaison with local authorities 
and any other relevant actors so as to integrate European civil 
protection assistance into the overall relief effort and facilitate the 
work of European teams on the ground. Moreover, as they continue 
to monitor the emergency and assess its development, they can keep 
the MIC headquarter updated. 
Other tools in the Community Mechanism are the Common Emergency 
and Information System (CECIS), which is a web-based alert and 
notification application created with the intention of facilitating 
emergency communication among the participating states, and a 
training programme, set up with a view to improving the co-ordination 
of civil protection assistance interventions by ensuring compatibility 
and complementarity between the intervention teams from the 
participating states
Cross-border pilot projects
In 2006, the European Parliament allocated additional sums of money 
for specific projects related to civil protection cooperation. The 
projects were intended to test innovative approaches in the field of 
civil protection by developing operational cross border civil protection 
modules. Modules are specific, predefined arrangements of member 
states’ civil protection resources, consisting of equipment, personnel 
or a combination thereof. Their goal is to either perform support 
functions or to meet priority needs arising from emergencies.
Several projects related to floodings were proposed and accepted: 
Flood management cross border (led by Germany), Fight floods (led 
by Latvia) and EU Flood Command (led by the United Kingdom). See 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/civil/prote/crossborder.htm for more 
information.
2.3 Recovery
Three Dutch organisations ‘HKV Lijn in water’, ‘COT’ and ‘Impact’ 
produced a concept checklist together as a fine example for 
preparations in the recovery-phase. During one of our workshops 
experts from ‘HKV Lijn in water’ introduced and explained this 
checklist. We were allowed to use this document.
This checklist is intended to create insight into the recovery-phase by 
illustrating issues and actions that need to be taken by crisis teams. 
Other goals of the checklist include improving the care given to 
victims and the acceleration of reconstruction in flooded areas.
The described aftercare activities are sub-divided in four groups:
I Reconstruction
II Temporary services
III Shelter of victims
IV Remediation management
Activities related to the psychosocial aftercare are shown in coloured 
boxes.  
In appendix you will find the complete concept checklist.
3. Products of the Chain of 
Safety Project
Within the EU each member state is responsible for its own system of 
disaster relief and crisis management.
However when taking into account the natural hazard ‘flood’ and 
taking into account the forthcoming sea-level rising a disaster that 
goes beyond the capacities of one member state to handle, such a 
disaster, can occur.
International (European) assistance is one of the ways to handle such 
a crisis in one ore more effected member states.
The Chain of Safety project focussed on a new way to handle this 
problem. Not from the point of view of who is responsible (by law) and 
which organisation can contribute to mitigate the effects of a flood, 
but first identify a worst credible flood in the North Sea Region, then 
identify the cross-border or transnational effects and then identify the 
possible assistance. It should all lead to a trans- national contingency 
plan on coastal flooding.
Why focus on such a contingency plan? Don’t we have a strong 
defence against the North Sea? Yes, we have! And we are safer than 
ever, but there is no 100% guarantee that flooding will never happen 
again. Following the safety chain, we know that we can perform 
better, especially regarding response-preparedness. 
So, there is a paradigm shift moving from “defend and manage” to 
“anticipate and respond”.
There is also a shift from “the government protects society from 
floods” to clear choices about living with the risk and the roles of 
government and those of other actors. Information, communication, 
awareness raising and response-planning become essential.
Taking into account directive 2007/60/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 23 October 2007 on the assessment and 
management of flood risk; not only preventive measures are important 
but there should be a balance between prevention and mitigation of 
the effects. The safety chain is a very useful instrument to give a 
first insight in the basic capabilities/capacities in the countries of the 
partners and if there is a balance in the links.
The inventory scheme in appendix 4 therefore could be the base to 
identify the areas on which further survey could be undertaken. 
Because preventive measures are already of a high standard and 
ongoing business in the member states of the partners the accent 
in the Chain of Safety project laid on the links preparation and the 
response and on the recovery link.
In the inventory, in each link, you can see the capabilities that are 
needed to handle a flood.
To be effective, it is advisable that the different member states of 
the partners should develop their local, regional and national plans, 
systems, risk-mapping etc. in such a way – to a trans-national 
contingency plan - that they complement each other capabilities 
to optimize the mitigation effects when an EU-region is effected. In 
the various workshops the experts pointed out that the best way 
to structure such plans is with strategic, tactical and operational 
layers.
To make transnational planning and assistance more complementary 
the Chain of Safety project developed a realistic flood scenario for 
the North Sea Region and gave special attention to:
- inventory of plans with capacities and capabilities;
- modulating equipment;
- evacuation planning;
- recovery planning;
- getting to know the crisis-management systems of the partners.
Besides the products on the above mentioned themes and based on 
these themes a PILOT cross-border contingency-plan is developed 
and tested in an exercise.
To produce these results knowledge is gathered and combined in a 
KNOWLEDGE DATA BASE, that will be part of the future Knowledge 
Centre on Crisis-management Coastal Flooding.
3.1 Inventory Scheme of Plans 
(Capacities and Capabilities)
To succeed in transnational contingency planning against floods local, 
‘regional’ and national plans should fit and complement each other to 
meet the needs  by demand of the worst credible flood.
Therefore the development of a worst credible flood scenario for 
the North Sea Region is a premise for succesful planning on local, 
‘regional’, national and NSR-level with respect of the capabilities and 
the responsibilities of the sovereign governmental bodies.
In order to get a short overview of the existing contingency planning 
within the participating partners of this project, a quick scan has 
been made. In appendix you will find the output of this quick scan in 
an inventory scheme.
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The inventory scheme outlines the basic capability or capacity along 
the links of the Safety Chain, regarding the Member States of the 
North Sea Region/Partners of the Project for different – governmental 
- levels. The goal is to get a rough insight in the necessary preparation 
to respond together when multiple members are affected by coastal 
floods. For each item bear in mind that the activity or capacity is 
based on a common/agreed/written plan, scheme, strategy, 
blueprint, design or scenario. 
Connected to this scheme, detailed plans of the partners are available 
on the website of the project www.chainofsafety.com (database 
“Knowledge”).
The scheme is the result of contributions from all partners and the 
discussion of the meetings at Blankenberge (BE) and Colchester 
(UK). 
Some aspects of the scheme are also dealt with in other international 
networks:
a. Vital Infrastructure (water defence works) is taken care of in the 
 EU Project Critical Infrastructure Protection
b. Modelling the chances (now and in future) of a flood happening, 
 and the technical consequences of a flooding, is taken care in 
 the EU Project Safecoast
c.  Risk awareness is dealt with in the Flood Awareness and Prevention 
 Policy project (FLAPP)
d. An evacuation practicum is an additional activity in the EU-Intereg 
 IIIC project Attention to Warning And Readiness in Emergencies  
 (AWARE)
e.  In the response link the item Assistance of neighbouring countries 
 is tackled on EU level with the Monitoring and Information Centre 
 (MIC).
f. Regarding equipment, the project EUFloodCommand, which 
 is co-financed by the EU-Commission, will deliver an EU system 
 of modular maritime (Search And Rescue) based aid for floods 
 in May 2008.
g. Regarding knowledge, a project CRUE – flooding European 
 Research Arena net – is being developed. Other related projects 
 are ENCORA, with a coastal portal, and flood projects related 
 with the EU Research institute at Italy.
3.2 Table of Contents for an 
Evacuation Plan
During one of the workshops a list of important issues that should be 
dealt with in an evacuation plan was created. This list is a framework 
or the table of contents for the different plans that have to be worked 
out in each partner country. It can also be used as a checklist to 
update the plans that allready exist. It provides a tool for the partners 
of the North Sea Region for deriving the benefit of a common ground 
to work together in case of flooding in the NSR. 
Note from the workshop is that all types of evacuation (were it a 
nuclear disaster, a bomb or a flood) are basically the same.
The workshop results are listed, in random order, below and based 
on the contributions of the partners and their experts.
• Preparation phase  / checklist
• Warning & information of the people
• Accommodation / shelter places / transport (people / livestock 
 / cultural inheritance)
• Care for the evacuated people (social structure / medical aid / 
 food / clothes / mobile fuel tanks)
• Recovery / repatriation  (also long term)
• Define different scenario’s (it may occur or it occurs)
• Traffic circulation plan (contra flow measures)
• Critical infra-structure
• Recovery (pollution / mental help)
• Continuity of operation (rescue-workers rescue their relatives first?)
• Public awareness (self-reliance)
• Who is responsible for what? How do they communicate? / 
 responsibilities
• Assistance (national and international)
• Foreigner assistance & support
• Decision-making / -levels
• Security aspects (area)
• Time of incident (winter/summer, day/night, weekend/week)
• Training & exercise
• Define the areas where and the circumstances when you don’t 
 want people to evacuate to and prepare for non evacuees
• Media-management
• Prognoses
3.3 Crisis Management 
in National/Regional 
Governments
During the explanation by the partners of the marks in the inventory 
schemes of capacities and capabilities we noticed that it was 
important to know the global structure of the crisis-management 
organisation in the different partner-countries.
3.3.1 United Kingdom
In 2004 parliament passed the Civil Contingencies Act, which forms 
the basis of crisis management in the United Kingdom. It on the one 
hand lays down the requirement for local authorities to assess risks 
and prepare for emergencies, and on the other hand provides the 
responsibilities of the national government. 
There are four different government levels relevant at times of a 
disaster in the United Kingdom. The district level is the lowest level, 
at this level emergency services cooperate. The UK is divided in 86 
counties, which serve as the central party in crisis management. The 
county level contingency planning is located. At the regional level (the 
UK has 9 regions) the  Regional Resilience Team and the  Government 
Office function as a link between the national government and 
local authorities. In some instances the scale or complexity of an 
emergency is such that some degree of central government support 
or co-ordination becomes necessary. Central government will not 
duplicate the role of local responders who remain the basic level of 
the response to an emergency. The United Kingdom uses a national 
framework for scaling up the local multi-agency response to, and 
recovery from, emergencies. Levels range from bronze, silver to gold.
As mentioned, as the counties form a central role in crisis management, 
specific contingency planning is located there. Contingency plans for 
flooding for each county are set up by the county council; there is no 
national flooding scenario. 
Also alerting of citizens is the responsibility of the county. Each county 
has a website on which they pay attention to civil security and safety 
(e.g. the website for the County Council of Essex is www.essexcc.
co.uk). The national government uses the website www.ukresilience.
info to inform citizens about civil protection.
3.3.2 The Netherlands
Crisis management in the Netherlands is laid down in different laws 
(Disaster Act; Fire Services Act; Medical Disasters Act etc.) which are 
united in the Act Safety Region that is expected to enter into force in 
2008 or 2009. A safety region is geographically based on the Police 
Act and is operationally the base for crisis management for all first 
responder organisations and municipalities. Based on this law, several 
operational (not standardised) procedures are in use. On regional 
level that is the Gecoördineerde Regionale Incidentenbestrijdings 
Procedure, or GRIP (Coordinated Regional Crisis Management 
Procedure), which is a general organizational structure used for all 
kinds of disasters. GRIP uses four levels of management and makes 
a division between the operative (safety and health issues) and policy 
(governmental decisions) structure. 
Some kinds of disasters have specific plans. The particular plan on 
the national level for flooding is the Nationaal Crisisplan Hoogwater 
en Overstromingen (National Plan of Response for High Water 
and Flooding, NRHO) by the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Relations. 
All safety regions have their own specific plans and the Water boards 
and the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management 
have their own water management-scenario, which is closely linked 
to the NRHO. In case of a worst credible flood (appendix 4), the 
management level is immediately raised to a kind of ‘supra’ GRIP 
4, which entails that the regions will use GRIP 4, but the national 
government takes a coordinating role over the municipalities. 
In this case, all the municipalities report to the national level 
via the coordinating mayor to the provincial governments. The 
Queens Commissioner, on behalf of the provincial government, is 
spokesperson for all the municipalities towards the ministries. 
The Netherlands has specific regional treaties with Belgium, 
Luxembourg and Germany, which give grounds for provincial 
authorities to make agreements with their foreign neighbours for 
arrangements in times of crises. 
For alerting citizens during an emergency the regional (provincial) 
media are included. Every province has an agreement with the 
respective local radio and television. On www.crisis.nl, people 
can find information on how to prepare for an emergency. During 
an emergency, this website will be changed to give up to date 
information.
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3.3.3 Denmark
Danish Civil Emergency Planning consists of two parts: Civil 
Preparedness and Rescue Preparedness. The regulations are laid 
down in The Danish Preparedness Act from 2000.
Civil Preparedness is defined as a plan for the continual function 
of society under extraordinary conditions. Its aim is to ensure that 
resources of the civil society are utilised in a co-ordinated manner.
The individual ministries are responsible for planning with their 
own respective areas in accordance with the principle of sector 
responsibility. The tasks that have been assigned to them are to 
maintain the functions of the Government and public administration, 
producing necessary legislation and providing guidance to regional 
and municipal authorities.
Furthermore the municipalities and the regional councils must 
likewise prepare contingency plans for all assignments that they are 
responsible for.
The Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA) has the 
coordinating responsibility on plans on national level on behalf of the 
Minister of Defence.
The main actors of Rescue Preparedness are the municipalities. 
The municipal rescue preparedness system must be capable of 
providing proper turnout services. In addition, it must be prepared 
to receive, accommodate and feed evacuees and other persons 
in distress, including victims of floods and other natural disasters. 
The municipal rescue services are supplemented by the national 
rescue preparedness system. It consists of five regional centres 
run by DEMA, which provide assistance to the Municipal Rescue 
Preparedness whenever such assistance is necessary, depending on 
the nature or extent of an accident or disaster. The regional centres 
train conscripts which make up the national rescue preparedness 
reserve.
Other important actors are the regional councils, which are responsible 
for the hospital preparedness, and the police, which is responsible 
for the co-ordination of the cooperation between different actors and 
for communication with the media and the public.
Twelve local co-ordinating groups have been established to co-ordinate 
the tasks in relation to all types of emergencies and catastrophes, 
which may occur in their respective geographical areas. The groups 
consist of representatives from the regional and local emergency 
management authorities and are chaired by the regional chief 
constables of the police. The purpose is to facilitate cooperation and 
coordinated utilisation of the resources in the region.
In case of major incidents that cannot be resolved in the individual 
regions The National Operative Staff takes over the role of 
coordination. The staff consists of representatives from the relevant 
authorities and its purpose is to strengthen co-ordination among the 
military, police and other authorities in the event of major national 
crises. The staff creates and maintains clarity and overview of a given 
situation as a basis for decision-making in the different sectors and 
nationally. The staff currently informs the National Crisis Management 
Organisation.
Due to the principle of sector responsibility the staff cannot make 
decisions which bind authorities or other actors. In crisis-situations 
the authorities must follow normal principles and procedures as far 
as possible. Authority is to a great extend delegated to the operative 
level, which means that the operative level may take the necessary 
measures without awaiting authorisation form the central level.
DEMA is responsible for coordinating the planning of the civil 
preparedness and national rescue preparedness and advising the 
authorities about civil emergency planning related issues.
Germany and Denmark has entered into a bilateral treaty in 1985 on 
mutual assistance at emergencies or serious accidents.
Contingency plans on flooding are part of the general municipal 
contingency plans. Recognising the higher risk on the West Coast 
of Denmark two separate warning and alarm services have been 
established. In the Wadden Sea Area some predefined meteorological 
and hydrographical criteria’s - dependant of strength of the dikes – for 
preventive evacuation of people in the low-lying areas are introduced. 
A similar system is established on the central part of the West Coast 
of Denmark.
3.3.4 Belgium
As a federal state Belgium knows multiple levels of government. 
Three of these form the basis of crisis management: the local 
(municipal), provincial and national or federal level. These different 
governmental levels have a similar organization. In case of a local 
disaster the mayor organises a Municipal Crisis Centre, which 
consists of representatives of the emergency services and experts 
from the fields. This centre decides on both the operational and policy 
question. This team, however, will probably be divided in the future 
into an operational and policy side. When management is scaled up 
to the provincial level, the governor takes over the coordinating role. 
He as well sets up a Provincial Crisis Centre. At the federal level the 
Minister of Internal Affairs has the decision-making power. The Crisis 
Coordination Centre (Algemene Directie Crisiscentrum, ADCC) the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for planning, organization 
during a crisis and also deals with issues of public order during major 
events. The ADCC is also the contact point for international aid in 
case of an emergency. 
There is no national contingency plan in Belgium for an emergency 
concerning flooding. Every municipality has its own specific 
contingency plans on issues that relate to that municipality. The 
provincial authorities of West-Flanders have an overarching plan for 
their specific role during an emergency. 
3.3.5 Germany
In German legislation, a distinction is made between civil defence 
and civil protection. The first lies within the responsibility of the 
Federation while the latter is a task of the Länder. Civil defence is 
an umbrella term for public and private measures to protect the 
population in a case of defence. In accordance with the Constitution 
of the Federal Republic of Germany, the responsibility for legislation 
in the field of civil defence lies with the Federation. The law is however 
largely enforced by the Federal Länder in administration by delegated 
authority. The tasks of the Federation are carried out by the Federal 
Ministry of the Interior, by other ministries within their remit, by the 
Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance (BBK) and 
by the Technisches Hilfswerk (THW). The Federal Ministry of the 
Interior provides a national crisis centre, which is the national contact 
point to the EU and other countries.
Any other cases of civil protection and disaster control in peace 
times are a matter for the Länder, which maintain civil protection 
procedures for this purpose. These are laid down in the Länder 
specific civil protection acts, e.g. in the Schleswig-Holstein State 
Civil Protection Act (Landeskatastrophenschutzgesetz Schleswig-
Holstein). On the Länder level, the responsibility is broken down to 
regional administrative levels. For instance in Schleswig-Holstein, the 
Chief Administrative Officer of the Kreis (County) is in charge of civil 
protection and takes over the command in case of a disaster in his 
county. He is assisted by a specially qualified staff. In case more than 
one County has been affected by an emergency, the Ministry of the 
Interior of the Land Schleswig-Holstein is then involved and its State 
Office for Civil Protection and Disaster Control undertakes the entire 
command of operations.
The Federation and the Länder are working closely together in a 
spirit of partnership in order to have a combined, powerful system 
of damage protection. This is largely based on voluntary helpers 
from private and public civil protection organisations. The private and 
public relief organisations are:
• the fire services
• Workers’ Samaritan Federation (ASB)
• German Red Cross (DRK)
• Johanniter-Unfall-Hilfe (accident assistance) (JUH)
• Malteser-Hilfsdienst (MHD)
• Deutsche Lebens-Rettungs-Gesellschaft (DLRG)
• Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk
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3.4  Equipment
One of the goals at the start of the project was - according to the 
project plan - an inventory on the needed equipment.
These were the expectations of the Working Committee members on 
the output of Action 3 (Equipment):
- the inventory should be a special part of the trans-national 
 contingency plan
- make a list of people who are in charge of equipment and logistics
- produce an agreement on exchange mechanisms
- the inventory should focus on the equipment not only on a 
 regional but also on a national scale, needed to tackle a severe 
 storm affecting more than one region (worst case scenario)
- both physical equipment and human resources should be included
- develop a system that stays actual (up to date-data) and delivers 
 useful information
Following these expectations, a list of questions and actions was set up
1. What kind of equipment do we need? Defining a catalogue for
 a. physical equipment (sand, sandbags, water pumps, boats,  
  helicopters, shelter places, etc)
 b. human resources (rescue personnel, carers, vets, engineers, 
  etc.)
2. What equipment is available and where, who are the contact  
 persons?
3. What structure of mutual assistance does already exist in and 
 between the regions? (survey on the existing exchange 
 mechanisms and structures e.g. by drawing a flow chart of the 
 authorities in charge and their connections)
Ad 1. and 2.
A form has been drafted and sent around to the project partners to 
serve as a first inventory on physical equipment and human resources. 
But looking at the feedback and the results, the conclusion came up 
that it could not be feasible as a project’s outcome to produce a 
detailed list or a central database of available equipment. This would 
mean double work, because resource databases are already kept 
and updated by the regional / national information and coordination 
centres. Hence it was proposed to concentrate on networking, i.e. 
making a list of contact points for resources. During the workshop 
discussions, invited experts pointed out that generally there is enough 
equipment available. The problem would mainly be to get it in time to 
the place where it is needed.
Ad 3
Further, the focus was directed to the question which structures of 
mutual assistance allready exist. In every country there are information 
and coordination centres on almost every level of administration. 
They gather information, process requests for assistance and 
coordinate rescue and emergency relief measures. On the EU level, 
the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC) of the EU plays this role. 
Mutual assistance between the member states is based upon the 
Community mechanism for civil protection.
Finally the question was discussed whether a common form or 
checklist of relevant equipment/expertise related to flooding could 
be used when asking for assistance. We put this question to the MIC 
and we received the answer that the MIC uses no such guideline 
or checklist. As a reason it was stated that they want to avoid that 
assistance is supply driven.
Experts at the workshop on equipment in Ribe pointed out that when 
asking for assistance, rather capabilities than resources should be 
defined. Furthermore, the EU mechanism on civil protection and the 
existing resource databases at the MIC were assigned to be sufficient. 
The partners agreed that the European mechanism should be the 
scale to arrange support from other countries in case of a trans-
national flood disaster at the North Sea. The project-partners are 
willing to assist the MIC in improving the EU Mechanism. The MIC can 
ask them to be part of a working-group that produces a MIC-form on 
the specific scenario of a coastal flooding in the North Sea Region.
3.5  Inventory of Domestic 
Equipment Organization
Equipment is a  key-element in disaster management. During the 
project a division was made between ‘human equipment’ (human 
resources) and physical equipment. Human equipment can range from 
engineers for issues such as the repair of dykes to medical personal 
or veterinaries for medical care for evacuees. Physical equipment can 
range from sandbags and bulldozers, to transportation for evacuees 
(busses, helicopters, etc.). Also buildings for shelter or emergency 
medical stations are defined as physical equipment. 
Although equipment-coordination is different in every country, there 
are several general problems that are encountered in almost all 
the partner-countries. The most important problems are related 
to keeping databases up to date and the (lack of) communication 
between levels of government. 
Most countries put the primary responsibility for obtaining and 
maintaining equipment at the municipal level and have a national 
agency to assist in larger events. Differences between the systems 
are seen in the organization of the national institution (volunteers or 
professional, to what extend can equipment be used by lower levels 
of government, etc.). 
In the United Kingdom, the lead department for Civil Protection is 
the Cabinet Office, they are in charge of the national policy. The 
Department of Communities and Local Government looks whether 
local governments have sufficient plans and equipment. In case of an 
incident involving terrorism, Home Office is in charge.
In the Netherlands, equipment-management is organised by the National 
Operational Coordination Centre (Landelijk Operationeel Coordinatie 
Centrum, LOCC). This institution is charged with the coordination of 
emergency services in case of a (national) disaster and functions as 
an ‘umbrella’ for all relevant organizations. At the moment an up-to-
date list of equipment owned by the national government (and used 
by local authorities) is present, and efforts are made on setting up a 
list of relevant equipment of private owners. Special equipment listed 
in a catalogue is available in the Department of Defence as result of 
Cabinet-agreements about civil-military cooperation.
In Denmark the emergency level is built up as a multi-level system. 
The municipality emergency service (level 1) is in charge of day to 
day preparedness and response. The number and kind of vehicles and 
equipment are based on a local risk assessment. The municipal and 
government support points (level 2) assist by supplying equipment 
for the most frequent tasks while the five government emergency 
response centres (level 3) assist in larger, longer lasting or 
particularly personnel intensive accidents. The governmental centres 
are operated by DEMA.
In Belgium, the municipalities, and more specifically the local 
emergency services, form the backbone of the system for equipment 
coordination. This gives them the opportunity to focus specifically on 
the local demands. The Civil Protection unit (Civiele Veiligheid) of the 
Ministry of Internal affairs assists the local services.
In Germany, the Länder civil protection units are run and maintained 
by the private and public relief organisations, e.g. fire brigades, 
German Red Cross a.o. Additional equipment and training is funded 
and provided by the Federation. The units and facilities of the 
Bundesanstalt Technisches Hilfswerk (THW) provide back-up for civil 
protection when it comes to rescue and technical assistance.
The most mentioned problem is the communication between levels of 
government. It is often the case that municipalities cannot, or are not 
willing to supply a list of their equipment to e.g. the provincial level. 
The same is the case towards the national governments. Especially 
Germany and Belgium have problems with this, as in their case 
equipment is divided over all levels of government. Related to this is 
the fact that most national governments have troubles keeping their 
database up to date. 
3.6  Summary of Pilot Cross-
Border Region Zeeland-West 
Flanders
The Netherlands and Belgium each have their own organisational 
structure for crisis-management when a flood happens. Within the 
Province of Zeeland a special contingencyplan on flooding is signed 
by the combined responsible authorities. In Belgium the general 
contingencyplans are used.
For cross-border aspects an Euregional Protocol leads the way since 
2003.
Within the Dutch-Belgian coastal region the results of the inventories 
on available plans and equipment were used to compare the existing 
situations. This has resulted in an example on how to deal with a 
transnational contingency plan for coastal flooding. The Dutch version 
of this ‘Pilot Plan’ will be printed for distribution. The English version 
will be put on the website www.chainofsafety.com.
Main aim was to establish the first steps towards the setting up of 
a joint contingency plan in a low laying bordering region, in which 
mutual cooperation is of essential nature for successful contingency 
planning and effectuation. 
This included sharing information on technical issues, such as water 
level prediction schemes, inventories regarding detailed elevation 
maps and land usage. Better insight is generated for the areas most 
likely to be affected in case of flooding, focussing at the situation in 
real life, instead of restricting to administrative units. 
Besides technical information the information on responsibilities of 
different authorities was shared in order to know which entities exist, 
how these are to be contacted, who has to be addressed for which 
role in calamities. Last essential input was to know what physical 
and technical infrastructures are present at what location; to provide 
the necessary support. This can be information on infrastructure, 
buildings to serve as shelters, equipment as boats, helicopters and 
so on. 
The product is a cross-border contingency-plan for the scenario 
coastal flooding. This includes the risks and scenario’s, the crisis-
management and crisis-organisation in schemes of both countries 
and a cross-border scheme, the description of the main processes, 
alarm-schemes, a communication paragraph and information about 
facilities and logistics. 
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3.7 Combining and 
centralising Knowledge
One of the aims of the Interreg-NSR Project Chain of Safety was 
to facilitate the cooperation and the exchange of knowledge in the 
event of coastal flooding.  Among other things, this project surveyed 
and compiled the existing knowledge regarding crisis-management 
in a coastal flooding. Contingency-plans, Response-measures and 
recovery-measures were the main topics. The need to combine and 
centralise this knowledge in a knowledge centre was one of the main 
conclusions. The partners agreed to ask the Province of Zeeland to 
organise this.
On the website of the project a database is filled with plans, documents 
and relevant links to other websites.
Important issue will be the added value for the European partners. To 
assure this in the organisational structure all cooperating partners will 
be involved; in a board or a steering committee. Also representatives 
of the professional safety-services are to be involved.
The Centre should host a library combined with a central data-base. 
There should be opportunities for research, studies, education and 
information. Not only for experts, but also for students and for the 
general public. The perspective is on a European scale.
The Knowledge Centre should be part of a European network of 
existing and planned regional knowledge centres/networks.  Its 
aim should be to link research and practice.  Furthermore, social, 
psychological and recovery elements should be included in this 
knowledge centre.  
The project-partners in Chain of Safety have consented to house all 
this knowledge in a future Knowledge Centre on Crisis-management 
Coastal Flooding. They agreed on the location in Zeeland, where also 
an experimental area can be developed. The Province of Zeeland 
initiates and stimulates this. 
The focus of the knowledge centre should be:
• to acquire knowledge, secure it and make it available; demand 
 orientated
• storing knowledge; data-bases, library etc.
• to specialise in the field of preparation, response and recovery; 
 and fill the gap between risk-management and crisis-management
• to create a link between that knowledge and the knowledge that 
 is being gained within the framework of courses in other 
 institutes
• to maintain interaction between water academy teaching staff 
 and those who proffer knowledge
• to link applied research in the area of coastal defence, safety, 
 processes within the chain of safety, risk- and crisis communication, 
 public awareness
• to connect knowledge with education on a variety of levels; 
 translate science to practical situations; academies will be 
 involved in planning so as to intensify the interaction between 
 training, knowledge and applied research.  The aim is to have 
 graduate (masters) students as well as undergraduate 
 (bachelors) students conduct applied research
• to form a link between the knowledge centres on a European 
 scale, like the Kennisnetwerk Deltawater (Knowledge Network 
 Delta Water) in the field of coastal safety and safety risks
• to centralise the experiences of the general public, including 
 victims, as input; and be accessible for the public as well
• to cooperate in public initiatives, in order to integrate and 
 connect initiatives
• to support awareness among young people via educational 
 programs
• give students specific tasks to develop ideas and products
4. Future Work and 
Recommendations
21st May 2008.
The European Project Chain of Safety is running to an end in June 
2008. The Steering Committee, in which all the partners from the 
North Sea Region are represented, concluded that the aims of the 
project have been achieved successfully. 
The recommendations will also be presented to the European authority 
that is responsible for civil protection and crisis-management.
The project-outcomes envisaged from the start were to combine all 
information about the national and regional initiatives to respond to a 
coastal flooding, and to produce a report as a basic document for a 
transnational agreement, e.g. a contingency-plan on coastal flooding 
for the North Sea Region countries. 
4.1 Plans
While making this report a great job was done in making inventories 
on the already existing national, regional and local plans in the 
different countries. 
With this linking document the representatives of the national 
governments can initiate a transnational meeting with their colleagues 
in the North Sea Region countries. Here they can promote the 
framework for a transnational contingency-plan on coastal flooding, 
and take the lead in producing the draft for this. The draft can be 
worked out in the final text for a transnational plan, or in a transnational 
treaty. 
During the project the idea of a matrix of separate decision making 
stages linked to a time scale came up. The concept originates from 
a plan which is instituted in the United States of America after the 
hurricane Katrina disaster in New Orleans. The idea basically comes 
down to a timeline, linked with a check list, such as the Recovery 
Index (appendix). This timeline would mark several time-frames before 
an expected dike breach (e.g. in steps of days, 12 hours or 6 hours), 
and the decisions that have to be taken within that time frame. An 
example can be evacuation; if the decision to evacuate a certain area 
is not made in time, there is no more possibility to evacuate at all 
(because e.g. there is not enough time to prepare shelter area’s, or 
roads will be blocked by the flooding, etc.).
Figure 5. Example of a possible decision making timeline
As this report can be of help to everyone in the field, the results, 
including this report, the website and the database should be 
combined with the efforts of for instance the European Union working 
groups (e.g. the working group on modular equipment systems) 
and Dutch initiatives such as the Taskforce Management Floodings 
(Taskforce Management Overstromingen TMO). 
4.2 Equipment
After a first inventory on the available equipment, as well human 
resources as materials, the conclusion is that most likely no country 
will have enough equipment to support itself, and there are no 
developed criteria based on capacity of equipment and personnel. 
Partners in the project subscribe the initiative of the Commission 
about modules (COMMISSION DECISION of 20 December 2007), 
because this meets the need to get an overview of equipment based 
on capacity.
Some countries have bilateral agreements to assist each other. 
These agreements are sometimes even worked out on a cross-border 
regional scale.  But mostly the European Community Mechanism on 
Civil Protection (MIC) should be the scale to arrange support from 
other countries. 
4.3 Knowledge
A data-base filled with the plans, relevant documents, useful websites 
and known expertise in the partner-countries is available on the 
internet. This data-base should be extended, but will be one of the 
tools that is going to be organised in the near future in the Knowledge-
Centre on Coastal Floodings that will be situated in Zeeland, as part 
of the Water Academy there.
The knowledge centre in Zeeland will specialize on coastal floodings, 
including the relation with specific delta-areas. This can be further 
developed in a European project, where the partners of the Chain 
of Safety-project are invited to participate. The initiative for this lies 
with the Province of Zeeland. The knowledge-centre will take part in a 
European network of knowledge-centres related to floodings with its 
special expertise on floodings by salt water and the delta-specifics.
4. Future Work and Recommendations 
21st May 2008. 
The European Project Chain of Safety is running to an end in June 2008. The 
Steering Committee, in which all the partners from the North Sea Region are 
represented, concluded that the aims of the project have been achieved successfully.  
The recommendations will also be presented to the European authority that is 
responsible f r ivil pr ection and crisis-m nagement. 
The project-outcomes envisaged from the start were to combine all information about 
the national and regional initiatives to respond to a coastal flooding, and to produce a 
report as a basic document for a transnational agreement, e.g. a contingency-plan on 
coastal flooding for the North Sea Region countries.
Plans
While making this report a great job was done in making inventories on the already 
existing national, regional and local plans in the different countries.
With this linking document the representatives of the national governments can 
initiate  tr nsnational meeting with their colleagues in the North Sea Region 
countries. Here they c n promot the fr m work for a transnational conting ncy-plan 
on coastal flooding, nd take the le d in producing the draft f r this. The draft can be 
worked out in the final text for a transnational plan, or in a transnational treaty.
During the project the idea of a matrix of separate decision making stages linked to a 
time scale came up. The concept originates from a plan which is instituted in the 
United Stat s of Am rica after the hurricane Katrina disaster in N w Orleans. T  
idea basically comes down to a tim line, linked wit  a check list, such as th  
Recovery Index (appendix). This tim lin  would mark s veral time-fram s befor  an 
expected dike breach (e.g. in steps of days, 12 hours or 6 hours), and the decisions 
that have to be taken within that time frame. An example can be evacuation; if the 
decision to evacuate a certain area is not made in time, there is no more possibility to 
evacuate at all (because e.g. there is not enough time to prepare shelter area's, or 
roads will be bl cked by the flooding, etc.). 
Figure 5. Example of a possible decision making timeline 
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4.4 Pilot
As a pilot an initiative to for a contingency-plan “coastal floodings 
in the cross-border region West-Flanders and Zeeland” has been 
developed. This plan has also been tested in an exercise with the 
regional  crisismanagement coordination-centres in both countries. 
This pilot will be a good example for other cross-border regions, but 
can also serve as input for the transnational contingency-plan.
4.5 General conclusion
The project was a good initiative to start to speak the same ‘language’ 
and will definitely accelerate the action-time in case of an event! 
The conclusion can be drawn that the project succeeded in reaching 
its aims. However, one must also consider that the project-outcomes 
from the start were due to be the primary basic document, the 
framework, for a transnational contingency-plan on coastal flooding 
for the North Sea Region countries. It can therefore be concluded 
that the project should get a follow-up, preferably in the new Interreg-
programme.
4.6 Recommendations
1. To have a mutual ‘legal’ base to develop plans that meet the effects 
of a flood effecting more than one country in the North Sea Region 
the existing national and regional agreements should first be analysed 
if they deliver such a base. For the moment there are some bi-lateral 
agreements and no transnational agreement. If the analysis is that 
there is no sufficient base, it is recommended that a Memorandum 
of Understanding could be the way to work out this transnational 
agreement.
2. It is recommended that the developed knowledge base in the 
project Chain of Safety becomes part of the Knowledge-Centre 
on Crisis-management Coastal Flooding in Zeeland. Here they will 
specialize on coastal floodings, including the relation with specific 
delta-areas. The partners of the Chain of Safety-project are invited to 
participate in the organisational structure, but also other interested 
partners can be involved. 
The knowledge-centre should take part in a European network of 
knowledge-centres related to floodings with its special expertise on 
floodings by salt water and the delta-specifics. To assure that in this 
way a central information-point can be established this knowledge-
centre should be presented to be adopted by the EU.
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Glossary of Terms
Glossery of Terms
For a common understanding of this document we will use the glossery 
of terms that was developed in the EU project FLOODsite in 2005. This 
concerns the field of risk-management. 
As far as we know there is no such a list available on civil protection in 
EU-context in the field of crisis-management.
Title Language of Risk, Project 
definitions
Lead Authors Ben Gouldby and Paul Samuels,
Contributors Frans Klijn, Frank Messner, 
Ad van Os, Paul Sayers, and 
Jochen Schanze
Distribution All team members, Board 
Members, External public 
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Coordinator.
Document Reference T32-04-01
Accuracy - closeness to reality.
Adaptive capacity - Is the ability to plan, prepare for, facilitate, and 
implement adaptation options. Factors that determine a community 
adaptive capacity include its economic wealth, its technology and 
infrastructure, the information, knowledge and skills that it possesses, 
the nature of its institutions, its commitment to equity, and its social 
capital.
Aims - The objectives of groups/individuals/organisations involved 
with a project. The aims are taken to include ethical and aesthetic 
considerations.
Attenuation (flood peak) - lowering a flood peak (and lengthening its 
base).
Basin (river) (see catchment area) - the area from which water runs off 
to a given river.
Catchment area - the area from which water runs off to a river
Bias - The disposition to distort the significance of the various pieces of 
information that have to be used.
Characterisation - The process of expressing the observed/predicted 
behaviour of a system and it’s components for optimal use in decision 
making.
Cognition - The conscious or unconscious process of deriving meaning 
from sensory data. So .perceived risk. might be more correctly termed 
.cognated. risk.
Conditional probability - The likelihood of some event given the prior 
occurrence of some other event.
Confidence interval - A measure of the degree of (un)certainty of an 
estimate. Usually presented as a percentage. For example, a confidence 
level of 95% applied to an upper and lower bound of an estimate indicates 
there is a 95% chance the estimate lies between the specified bounds. 
Confidence limits can be calculated for some forms of uncertainty (see 
knowledge uncertainty), or estimated by an expert (see judgement).
Consequence - An impact such as economic, social or environmental 
damage/improvement that may result from a flood. May be expressed 
quantitatively (e.g. monetary value), by category (e.g. High, Medium, 
Low) or descriptively.
Coping capacity - The means by which people or organisations use 
available resources and abilities to face adverse consequences that 
could lead to a disaster. 
Correlation - Between two random variables, the correlation is a 
measure of the extent to which a change in one tends to correspond 
to a change in the other. One measure of linear dependence is the 
correlation coefficient p. If variables are independent random variables 
then p = 0. Values of +1 and –1 correspond to full positive and negative 
dependence respectively. Note: the existence of some correlation need 
not imply that the link is one of cause and effect.
Critical element - A system element, the failure of which will lead to the 
failure of the system.
Damage potential - A description of the value of social, economic and 
ecological impacts (harm) that would be caused in the event of a flood.
Decision uncertainty - The rational inability to choose between 
alternative options.
Defence system - Two or more defences acting to achieve common goals 
(e.g. maintaining flood protection to a floodplain area/ community).
Design objective - The objective (put forward by a stakeholder), 
describing the desired performance of an intervention, once 
implemented.
Design discharge - See Design standard and Design flood
Design standard - A performance indicator that is specific to the 
engineering of a particular defence to meet a particular objective under 
a given loading condition. Note: the design standard will vary with load, 
for example there may be different performance requirements under 
different loading conditions.
Dependence - The extent to which one variable depends on another 
variable. Dependence affects the likelihood of two or more thresholds 
being exceeded simultaneously. When it is not known whether 
dependence exists between two variables or parameters, guidance on 
the importance of any assumption can be provided by assessing the fully 
dependent and independent cases (see also correlation).
Deterministic process / method - A method or process that adopts 
precise, single-values for all variables and input values, giving a single 
value output.
Discharge (stream, river) - as measured by volume per unit of time.
Efficiency - In everyday language, the ratio of outputs to inputs; in 
economics, optimality.
Element - A component part of a system
Element life - The period of time over which a certain element will 
provide sufficient strength to the structure with or without maintenance.
Emergency management - The ensemble of the activities covering 
emergency planning, emergency control and post-event assessment.
Epistemology - A theory of what we can know and why or how we can 
know it.
Ergonomics - The study of human performance as a function of the 
difficulty of the task and environmental conditions. 
Error - Mistaken calculations or measurements with quantifiable and 
predictable differences.
Evacuation scheme - plan for the combination of actions needed for 
evacuation (warning, communication, transport etc.).
Event (in context) - In FLOODsite these are the conditions which may 
lead to flooding. An event is, for example, the occurrence in Source 
terms of one or more variables such as a particular wave height 
threshold being exceeded at the same time a specific sea level, or in 
Receptor terms a particular flood depth. When defining an event it can 
be important to define the spatial extent and the associated duration. 
Appendix 1 expands upon this definition.
Exposure - Quantification of the receptors that may be influenced by a 
hazard (flood), for example, number of people and their demographics, 
number and type of properties etc.
Expectation - Expectation, or .expected value. of a variable, refers to 
the mean value the variable takes. For example, in a 100 year period, a 
1 in 100 year event is expected to be equalled or exceeded once. This 
can be defined mathematically 
Expected annual frequency - Expected number of occurrences per 
year (reciprocal of the return period of a given event).
Expected value - see Expectation
Extrapolation - The inference of unknown data from known data, for 
instance future data from past data, by analysing trends and making 
assumptions.
Failure - Inability to achieve a defined performance threshold (response 
given loading).
“Catastrophic” failure describes the situation where the consequences 
are immediate and severe, whereas “prognostic” failure describes the 
situation where the consequences only grow to a significant level when 
additional loading has been applied and/or time has elapsed.
Failure mode - Description of one of any number of ways in which a 
defence or system may fail to meet a particular performance indicator.
Flood - A temporary covering of land by water outside its normal 
confines.
Flood control (measure) - A structural intervention to limit flooding and 
so an example of a risk management measure.
Flood damage - damage to receptors (buildings, infrastructure, goods), 
production and intangibles (life, cultural and ecological assets) caused 
by a flood.
Flood forecasting system - A system designed to forecast flood levels 
before they occur.
Flood hazard map - map with the predicted or documented extent of 
flooding, with or without an indication of the flood probability.
Flood level - water level during a flood.
Flood management measures - Actions that are taken to reduce 
either the probability of flooding or the consequences of flooding or 
some combination of the two.
Flood peak - highest water level recorded in the river during a flood.
Floodplain - part of alluvial plain that would be naturally flooded in the 
absence of engineered interventions.
Flood prevention - actions to prevent the occurrence of an extreme 
discharge peak.
Flood protection (measure) - to protect a certain area from inundation 
(using dikes etc).
Flood risk zoning - delineation of areas with different possibilities and 
limitations for investments, based on flood hazard maps.
Flood risk management - Continuous and holistic societal analysis, 
assessment and mitigation of flood risk.
Flood warning system (FWS) - A system designed to warn members 
of the public of the potential of imminent flooding. Typically linked to a 
flood forecasting system.
Flooding System (in context) - In the broadest terms, a system may 
be described as the social and physical domain within which risks arise 
and are managed. An understanding of the way a system behaves and, 
in particular, the mechanisms by which it may fail, is an essential aspect 
of understanding risk. This is true for an organisational system like flood 
warning, as well as for a more physical system, such as a series of flood 
defences protecting a flood plain.
Fragility - The propensity of a particular defence or system to fail 
under a given load condition. Typically expressed as a fragility function 
curve relating load to probability of failure. Combined with descriptors 
of decay/deterioration, fragility functions enable future performance to 
be described.
Functional design - The design of an intervention with a clear 
understanding of the performance required of the intervention.
Governance - The processes of decision making and implementation
Harm - Disadvantageous consequences . economic, social or 
environmental. (See Consequence).
Hazard - A physical event, phenomenon or human activity with the 
potential to result in harm. A hazard does not necessarily lead to harm.
Hazard mapping - The process of establishing the spatial extents of 
hazardous phenomena.
Hierarchy - A process where information cascades from a greater 
spatial or temporal scale to lesser scale and vice versa.
Human reliability - Probability that a person correctly performs a 
specified task.
Ignorance - Lack of knowledge
Institutional uncertainty - inadequate collaboration and/or trust 
among institutions, potentially due to poor communication, lack of 
understanding, overall bureaucratic culture, conflicting sub-cultures, 
traditions and missions.
Integrated risk management - An approach to risk management that 
embraces all sources, pathway sand receptors of risk and considers 
combinations of structural and non-structural solutions.
Integrated Water Resource Management - IWRM is a process which 
promotes the co-ordinated management and development of water, 
land and related resources, in order to maximise the resultant economic 
and social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the 
sustainability of vital ecosystems.
Intervention - A planned activity designed to effect an improvement in 
an existing natural or engineered system (including social, organisation/
defence systems).
Inundation - Flooding of land with water. (NB: In certain European 
languages this can refer to deliberate flooding, to reduce the 
consequences of flooding on nearby areas, for example. The general 
definition is preferred here.)
Joint probability - The probability of specific values of one or more 
variables occurring simultaneously. For example, extreme water levels in 
estuaries may occur at times of high river flow, times of high sea level or 
times when both river flow and sea level are above average levels. When 
assessing the likelihood of occurrence of high estuarine water levels it 
is therefore necessary to consider the joint probability of high river flows 
and high sea levels. 
Judgement - Decisions taken arising from the critical assessment of the 
relevant knowledge.
Knowledge - Spectrum of known relevant information.
Knowledge uncertainty - Uncertainty due to lack of knowledge of all 
the causes and effects in a physical or social system. For example, a 
numerical model of wave transformation may not include an accurate 
mathematical description of all the relevant physical processes. Wave 
breaking aspects may be parameterised to compensate for the lack of 
knowledge regarding the physics. The model is thus subject to a form 
of knowledge uncertainty. Various forms of knowledge uncertainty exist, 
including: Process model uncertainty . All models are an abstraction 
of reality and can never be considered true. They are thus subject to 
process model uncertainty. Measured data versus modelled data 
comparisons give an insight into the extent of model uncertainty but 
do not produce a complete picture. Statistical inference uncertainty - 
Formal quantification of the uncertainty of estimating the population from 
a sample. The uncertainty is related to the extent of data and variability 
of the data that make up the sample.
Statistical model uncertainty - Uncertainty associated with the fitting 
of a statistical model. The statistical model is usually assumed to be 
correct. However, if two different models fit a set of data equally well but 
have different extrapolations/interpolations then this assumption is not 
valid and there is statistical model uncertainty.
Legal uncertainty - the possibility of future liability for actions or 
inaction. The absence of undisputed legal norms strongly affects the 
relevant actors. decisions.
Likelihood - A general concept relating to the chance of an event 
occurring. Likelihood is generally expressed as a probability or a 
frequency.
Limit state - The boundary between safety and failure.
Load - Refers to environmental factors such as high river flows, water 
levels and wave heights, to which the flooding and erosion system is 
subjected.
Mitigation - see Flood management measures
Natural variability - Uncertainties that stem from the assumed inherent 
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randomness and basic unpredictability in the natural world and are 
characterised by the variability in known or observable populations.
Parameters - The parameters in a model are the constants, chosen 
to represent the chosen context and scenario. In general the following 
types of parameters can be recognised: Exact parameters - which are 
universal constants, such as the mathematical constant: Pi (3.14259...). 
Fixed parameters - which are well determined by experiment and may 
be considered exact, such as the acceleration of gravity, g (approximately 
9.81 m/s). 
A-priori chosen parameters - which are parameters that may be 
difficult to identify by calibration and so are assigned certain values. 
However, the values of such parameters are associated with uncertainty 
that must be estimated on the basis of a-priori experience, for example 
detailed experimental or field measurements.
Calibration parameters - which must be established to represent 
particular circumstances. They must be determined by calibration 
of model results for historical data on both input and outcome. The 
parameters are generally chosen to minimise the difference between 
model outcomes and measured data on the same outcomes. It is 
unlikely that the set of parameters required to achieve a “satisfactory” 
calibration is unique.
Pathway - Route that a hazard takes to reach Receptors. A pathway 
must exist for a Hazard to be realised.
Performance - The degree to which a process or activity succeeds 
when evaluated against some stated aim or objective.
Performance indicator - The well-articulated and measurable objectives 
of a particular project or policy. These may be detailed engineering 
performance indicators, such as acceptable wave overtopping rates, 
rock stability, or conveyance capacity or more generic indicators such 
as public satisfaction.
Post-flood mitigation - Measures and instruments after flood events to 
remedy flood damages and to avoid further damages.
Precautionary Principle - Where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a 
reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.
Precision - degree of exactness regardless of accuracy.
Pre-flood mitigation - Measures and instruments in advance to a flood 
event to provide prevention (reducing flood hazards and flood risks 
by e.g. planning) and preparedness (enhancing organizational coping 
capacities).
Preparedness - The ability to ensure effective response to the impact 
of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings 
and the temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened 
locations.
Preparedness Strategy - Within the context of flood risk management 
a preparedness strategy aims at ensuring effective responses to the 
impact of hazards, including timely and effective early warnings and the 
evacuation of people and property from threatened locations.
Probability - A measure of our strength of belief that an event will 
occur. For events that occur repeatedly the probability of an event is 
estimated from the relative frequency of occurrence of that event, out of 
all possible events. In all cases the event in question has to be precisely 
defined, so, for example, for events that occur through time reference 
has  to be made to the time period, for example, annual exceedance 
probability. Probability can be exp ressed as a fraction, % or decimal. 
For example the probability of obtaining a six with a shake of four dice is 
1/6, 16.7% or 0.167.
Probabilistic method - Method in which the variability of input values 
and the sensitivity of the results are taken into account to give results in 
the form of a range of probabilities for different outcomes.
Probability density function (distribution) - Function which describes 
the probability of different values across the whole range of a variable 
(for example flood damage, extreme loads, particular storm conditions 
etc).
Probabilistic reliability methods - These methods attempt to define 
the proximity of a structure to fail through assessment of a response 
function. They are categorised as Level III, II or I, based on the degree 
of complexity and the simplifying assumptions made (Level III being the 
most complex).
Process model uncertainty - See Knowledge uncertainty.
Project Appraisal - The comparison of the identified courses of action 
in terms of their performance against some desired ends.
Progressive failure - Failure where, once a threshold is exceeded, 
significant (residual) resistance remains enabling the defence to maintain 
restricted performance. The immediate consequences of failure are 
not necessarily dramatic but further, progressive, failures may result 
eventually leading to a complete loss of function.
Proportionate methods - Provide a level of assessment and analysis 
appropriate to the importance of the decision being made.
Proprietary uncertainty - indicates contested rights to know, to warn 
or to secrete. In both risk assessment and management, there are often 
considerations about the rights of different people to know, to warn or 
to conceal
Random events - Events which have no discernible pattern.
Receptor - Receptor refers to the entity that may be harmed (a person, 
property, habitat etc.). For example, in the event of heavy rainfall (the 
source) flood water may propagate across the flood plain (the pathway) 
and inundate housing (the receptor) that may suffer material damage (the 
harm or consequence). The vulnerability of a receptor can be modified 
by increasing its resilience to flooding.
Record (in context) - Not distinguished from event (see Event)
Recovery time - The time taken for an element or system to return to 
its prior state after a perturbation or applied stress.
Reliability index - A probabilistic measure of the structural reliability 
with regard to any limit state.
Residual life - The residual life of a defence is the time to when the 
defence is no longer able to achieve minimum acceptable values of 
defined performance indicators (see below) in terms of its serviceability 
function or structural strength.
Residual risk - The risk that remains after risk management and 
mitigation measures have been implemented. May include, for example, 
damage predicted to continue to occur during flood events of greater 
severity that the 100 to 1 annual probability event.
Resilience - The ability of a system/community/society/defence to 
react to and recover from the damaging effect of realised hazards.
Resistance - The ability of a system to remain unchanged by external 
events.
Response (in context) - The reaction of a defence or system to 
environmental loading or changed policy.
Response function - Equation linking the reaction of a defence or 
system to the environmental loading conditions (e.g. overtopping 
formula) or changed policy.
Return period - The expected (mean) time (usually in years) between 
the exceedence of a particular extreme threshold. Return period is 
traditionally used to express the frequency of occurrence of an event, 
although it is often misunderstood as being a probability of occurrence. 
Risk - Risk is a function of probability, exposure and vulnerability. 
Often, in practice, exposure is incorporated in the assessment of 
consequences, therefore risk can be considered as having two 
components . the probability that an event will occur and the impact (or 
consequence) associated with that event. Risk = Probability multiplied 
by consequence 
Risk analysis - A methodology to objectively determine risk by analysing 
and combining probabilities and consequences.
Risk assessment - Comprises understanding, evaluating and interpreting 
the perceptions of risk and societal tolerances of risk to inform decisions 
and actions in the flood risk management process. 
Risk communication (in context) - Any intentional exchange of 
information on environmental and/or health risks between interested parties.
Risk management - The complete process of risk analysis, risk 
assessment, options appraisal and implementation of risk management 
measures.
Risk management measure - An action that is taken to reduce either 
the probability of flooding or the consequences of flooding or some 
combination of the two.
Risk mapping - The process of establishing the spatial extent of risk 
(combining information on probability and consequences). Risk mapping 
requires combining maps of hazards and vulnerabilities. The results of 
these analyses are usually presented in the form of maps that show the 
magnitude and nature of the risk.
Risk mitigation - See Risk reduction.
Risk perception - Risk perception is the view of risk held by a person or 
group and reflects cultural and personal values, as well as experience.
Risk reduction - The reduction of the likelihood of harm, by either 
reduction in the probability of a flood occurring or a reduction in the 
exposure or vulnerability of the receptors.
Risk profile - The change in performance, and significance of the 
resulting consequences, under a range of loading conditions. In particular 
the sensitivity to extreme loads and degree of uncertainty about future 
performance.
Risk register - An auditable record of the project risks, their consequences 
and significance, and proposed mitigation and management measures.
Risk significance (in context) - The separate consideration of the 
magnitude of consequences and the frequency of occurrence.
Robustness - Capability to cope with external stress. A decision is 
robust if the choice between the alternatives is unaffected by a wide 
range of possible future states of nature. Robust statistics are those 
whose validity does not depend on close approximation to a particular 
distribution function and/or the level of measurement achieved.
Scale - Difference in spatial extent or over time or in magnitude; critical 
determinant of vulnerability, resilience etc.
Scenario - A plausible description of a situation, based on a coherent 
and internally consistent set of assumptions. Scenarios are neither 
predictions nor forecasts. The results of scenarios (unlike forecasts) 
depend on the boundary conditions of the scenario.
Sensitivity - Refers to either: the resilience of a particular receptor to 
a given hazard. For example, frequent sea water flooding may have 
considerably greater impact on a fresh water habitat, than a brackish 
lagoon; or: the change in a result or conclusion arising from a specific 
perturbation in input values or assumptions.
Sensitivity Analysis - The identification at the beginning of the appraisal 
of those parameters which critically affect the choice between the 
identified alternative courses of action.
Social learning - Processes through which the stakeholders learn 
from each other and, as a result, how to better manage the system in 
question.
Social resilience - The capacity of a community or society potentially 
exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing in order to reach 
and maintain an acceptable level of functioning and structure. This is 
determined by the degree to which the social system is capable of 
organising itself to increase its capacity for learning from past disasters 
for better future protection and to improve risk reduction measures.
Spatial planning - Public policy and actions intended to influence the 
distribution of activities in space and the linkages between them. It will 
operate at EU, national and local levels and embraces land use planning 
and regional policy.
Standard of service - The measured performance of a defined 
performance indicator.
Severity - The degree of harm caused by a given flood event.
Source - The origin of a hazard (for example, heavy rainfall, strong 
winds, surge etc).
Stakeholders - Parties/persons with a direct interest (stake) in an issue, 
also Stakeowners.
Stakeholder Engagement - Process through which the stakeholders 
have power to influence the outcome of the decision. Critically, the 
extent and nature of the power given to the stakeholders varies between 
different forms of stakeholder engagement.
Statistic - A measurement of a variable of interest which is subject to 
random variation.
Strategy (flood risk management-) . A strategy is a combination 
of long-term goals, aims, specific targets, technical measures, policy 
instruments, and process which are continuously aligned with the 
societal context.
Strategic spatial planning - Process for developing plans explicitly 
containing strategic intentions referring to spatial development. Strategic 
plans typically exist at different spatial levels (local, regional etc).
Statistical inference uncertainty - See Knowledge uncertainty
Statistical model uncertainty - See Knowledge uncertainty
Sustainable Development - is development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs
Sustainable flood risk management - involves:
• ensuring quality of life by reducing flood damages but being prepared 
 for floods
• mitigating the impact of risk management measures on ecological 
 systems at a variety of spatial and temporal scales
• the wise use of resources in providing, maintaining and operating 
 infrastructure and risk management measures
• maintaining appropriate economic activity (agricultural, industrial, 
 commercial, residential) on the flood plain
Sustainable flood risk management strategy - An approach which
• aims to be effective in the long term, and
• can be combined (‘integrated’) with other international, national and 
 regional activities (transport, environment, conservation etc.)
Susceptibility - The propensity of a particular receptor to experience 
harm.
System - An assembly of elements, and the interconnections between 
them, constituting a whole and generally characterised by its behaviour. 
Applied also for social and human systems.
System state - The condition of a system at a point in time.
Tolerability - Refers to willingness to live with a risk to secure certain 
benefits and in the confidence that it is being properly controlled. To 
tolerate a risk means that we do not regard it as negligible, or something 
we might ignore, but rather as something we need to keep under review, 
and reduce still further if and as we can. Tolerability does not mean 
acceptability.
Ultimate limit state - Limiting condition beyond which a structure or 
element no longer fulfils any measurable function in reducing flooding.
Uncertainty - A general concept that reflects our lack of sureness about 
someone or something, ranging from just short of complete sureness to 
an almost complete lack of conviction about an outcome.
Validation - is the process of comparing model output with observations 
of the ’real world’.
Variability - The change over time of the value or state of some 
parameter or system or element where this change may be systemic, 
cyclical or exhibit no apparent pattern.
Variable - A quantity which can be measured, predicted or forecast 
which is relevant to describing the state of the flooding system e.g. 
water level, discharge, velocity, wave height, distance, or time. A 
prediction or forecast of a variable will often rely on a simulation model 
which incorporates a set of parameters.
Voluntariness - The degree to which an individual understands and 
knowingly accepts the risk to which they are exposed in return for 
experiencing a perceived benefit. For an individual may preferentially 
choose to live in the flood plain to experience its beauty and tranquillity. 
Vulnerability - Characteristic of a system that describes its potential to 
be harmed. This can be considered as a combination of susceptibility 
and value.considered as a combination of susceptibility and value.
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Storm surges represent a major natural hazard in the North Sea 
region, with around 40,000 km_ of low-lying land at coastal flood risk 
in the Netherlands, Germany, Belgium, Denmark and the UK.  If during 
a major storm the flood defence measures cannot resist the pressure 
of a large storm, large areas are at risk to flooding. 
Since flooding disasters and their effects do not stop at local, regional 
or even national borders, transnational cooperation in contingency 
planning is very important.
To make good preparation on flood disasters, it is important to get 
insight in the potential scale of a coastal flooding. This memo will 
present the threatened areas of a ‘worst credible flood’ in the North 
Sea Region. A ‘worst credible flood’ is a flood, which occurs during a 
very extreme, however still possible situation. 
Contingency planners can base their preparations on the ‘worst 
credible flood’ scenarios. 
In the framework of the Dutch ‘National Strategy for High Water and 
Storm Surge Crisis’ flood defence experts have developed the ‘worst 
credible flood’ scenarios and translated them to zones in which 
different areas maybe flooded simultaneously (figure 1). The scenarios 
are based on situations that exceed the level of protection.  
The main threats from sea are storm surges caused by winds with 
hurricane-like force. The Worst Credible Flood will occur when a 
depression with hurricane winds crosses the North Sea towards 
Denmark and lasts for one-and-a-half day. This situation occurs ones 
in the hundred-thousand year. 
A storm surge can only be predicted one-and-a-half day in advance. 
This short time notice and the weather circumstances during a 
hurricane, makes evacuation of the threatened area very hard. The 
storm surge predictions will be more accurate as the peek of the 
storm comes closer.
The damage caused by a flooding from sea mainly depends on 
the duration of the storm and the amount of breaches in the sea 
defences.
 
Figure 1, ‘Worst credible flood’ areas in the Netherlands (Kolen & Geerts, 2006)
I  South coastal area
II  Central coastal area
III  Lakes
IV  Northern coastal area
V Up-stream river area
VI  Down-stream river area
Figure 3. ‘Worst credible flood’ 
areas in the North Sea region.
Based on these insights and on historical date 
of storms occurred in the past, a qualitative 
extrapolation into the North Sea has been made 
(figure 3). It has been assumed that the location 
of simultaneous flooded areas along the North 
Sea depends on the direction of the depression: 
N - NW storms will mainly threaten the Dutch, 
German and Danish coast, N- NE will mainly 
threaten the Dutch and Belgian coast and the 
Southeast coast of the United Kingdom. Which 
area will threaten depends on the direction of 
the depression. It is likely that more than one of 
the areas will be flooded simultaneously.  Figure 
2 shows areas affected by some mayor storm 
surges flooding in the past. Figure 3 shows 
the qualitative extrapolation into the North 
Sea region.
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Figure 2. Three mayor storm surges in 
the North Sea (RMS Solutions)
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2  Checklists 
2.1 Reconstruct ion 
Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
I  Reconstruction 
 
Housing   
 Reconstruct  housing 
 Clean and repair 
 Demolish and rebuild 
 Flood-resistant building (yes/no) 
 Building material availability (hardware store for individuals) 
 Organise waste disposal systems 
 Utilise heavy equipment (e.g. front loader, excavator) 
 Utilise light equipment (e.g. spade, pickaxe) 
 Allow residents to enter the area and observe the damage and (where possible) secure private belongings 
 Work to keep existing social structures intact during re-distribution of lots  
 Involve residents in the planning of new neighbourhoods 
Companies and industries 
  
 Reconstruct  general companies and industries 
 Clean and repair 
 Demolish and rebuild 
 Repair production resources 
 Repair production process 
 Repair supply and distribution 
 Clean and repair (special attention to manure, insecticides, milk storage reservoirs) 
 Destroy decaying harvest and contaminated food products 
 Repair equipment and gear 
 Plough/sow clean earth 
 Arrange temporary use of equipment 
 Reconstruct  companies that  use chemicals and fuels 
 Clean and repair 
 Demolish and rebuild 
 Isolate and clean pollution from chemical industry (e.g. soil remediation) 
 Repair storage of chemical substances 
 Repair production facilities 
 Review whether companies have the needed recuperative abilities and financial support 
 Focus on small and medium companies 
Special objects 
  
 Functioning of s trategic objects/junctions vital infrastructure 
 Clean and repair 
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1  Introduction 
This concept checklist is intended to create insight into the a ftercare phase by illustrating issues and 
actions that need to be taken by crisis teams.  Other goals o f the checklist include improving the care 
given to victims and the acceleration o f reconstruction in flooded areas.  In addition to this concept 
checklist, a handout for the a ftercare phase will be distributed.  
 
A case study is being performed at the Province North-Holland, as part o f the project ‘Scenario analysis 
and planning: from threat o f flooding until evacuation’.  This checklist is being used to assist the writing 
of repair and reconstruction plans.  
 
The described a ftercare activities are sub-divided in four groups: 
 
I Reconstruction 
II Temporary services 
III Shelter o f v ictims 
IV Remediation management 
 
Activities related to the psychosocial a ftercare are shown in coloured boxes.   
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Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
I  Reconstruction 
 
 Repair gas supply to and into housing 
 Inspect connections at the household level 
 Reconstruct  municipal waste disposal 
 Repair incinerators  
 Restore old landfill sites or open new landfill sites 
 Re-establish waste collection service (vehicles, installations) 
 Reconstruct  potable water supply 
 Arrange temporary waste treatment facilities (collection, inspection, recycling, discharge of waste) 
 Clean water intake points 
 Arrange alternative sources of potable water 
 Inspect and clean pumping stations 
 Repair network (water pipes and mains) 
 Connect users to the network 
 Reconstruct  sewer system  
 Repair main discharge system 
 Clean sewer system of deposits 
 Repair sewer system (network, control panels) 
 Repair sewage treatment installations 
 Connect users to the network 
Infrastructure   
 Reconstruct  roads 
 Clean main roads at local community level  
 Repair main roads at local community level 
 Repair infrastructural objects such as bridges, overpasses, tunnels 
 Repair junctions in infrastructure 
 Set up fuel distribution points: repair fuel stations or arrange temporary fuel depots 
 Repair secondary roads 
 Reconstruct  underground infrastructure 
 Reconstruct tunnels & metro 
 Reconstruct  public transport (bus) 
 Arrange busses 
 Plan interim routes and bus stops 
 Reconstruct  harbours 
 Repair quay facilities 
 Set up storage and distribution facilities 
 Arrange access from land and water 
 Reconstruct  waterways 
 Clear wrecks and rubbish 
 Organise dredging & repair embankments  
 Reconstruct  railroads 
 Communicate timing of railroad remediation, including: inspection, repair, testing 
 Build ballast foundation, sleepers, rails, cabling, communication etc. 
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Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
I  Reconstruction 
 
 Demolish and rebuild 
 Guard 
 Arrange continuity in functionality 
 Reconstruct  fragile/valuable objects 
 Clean and repair 
 Demolish and rebuild 
 Secure and guard 
 Arrange continuity in functionality 
 Utilize public information points or places that are of importance for social networks 
 Arrange monument/ memorial 
Environment   
 Clean public spaces 
 Clean debris (categorise as household, rubble, greens, appliances, chemical and others)  
 Clean (possibly contaminated) deposits 
 Remove cadavers 
 Disinfect areas 
 Pest control 
 Communicate damage, danger, environmental consequences and exposure to hazardous materials (what 
are health issues – now and in the future – for victims?)  Provide the opportunity to ask questions (hotline, 
information sessions) 
Flood defences   
 Reconstruct  water related structures 
 Repair and strengthen flood defences 
 Repair civil infrastructure 
 Repair pumping stations 
 
Inform why new structures ensure the areas safety.   
Provide the opportunity to ask questions (hotline, information sessions) 
Power supply   
 Reconstruct  power supply 
 Repair electrical power plants 
 Repair large scale distribution network (e.g. cables, distribution points) 
 Repair small scale distribution network (e.g. transformer stations, area connections) 
 Keep emergency electrical generators available for extended period 
 Clean and test flooded transformer stations 
 Repair and inspect transformer stations 
 Inspect connections per household/company/organisation 
 Reconstruct  permanent communication infrastructure 
 Repair network 
 Connect users to network 
 Reconstruct  gas supply 
 Inspect and repair pressure regulating stations 
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2.3 Shelter of v ic t ims 
Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
III  Shelter of vic t ims 
 
Temporary housing evacuees 
 Organise emergency housing (inside and outside the f looded area) 
 Make available holiday homes, old military barracks, hotels, camp grounds, ships etc. 
 Set up new tent camps/prefab emergency housing/container camps 
 Store and register property originating from the affected area 
 Set up sanitary facilities, aggregators, beds, shelter, shops etc. 
 Afterwards dismantle temporary housing  
 Clean and dismantle emergency facilities 
 Inform about duration of temporary housing and reconstruction of own housing 
 Where are livestock (e.g. cows, pigs, horses, poultry) located? 
Organised return of evacuees 
 Organise return of evacuees 
 Organise evacuees returning by car 
 Organise evacuees returning by public transport or special transport 
 Organise return of livestock 
Public services 
 Organise health care system 
 Emergency hospitals 
 Mobile first-aid posts (containers) 
 Psychological care 
 Vaccination materials 
 Care of food supply 
 Establish shops 
 Provide products to shops  
 Support of existing formal and informal social networks 
 Function of information and advise centres 
 
Portray clear message about financial compensation, prepayment, insurance, legal assistance etc. as soon 
as possible. 
Employment  
 Arrange employment opportunities 
 Arrange temporary office space (containers, wood, prefab, hard-body tents) 
 Employ local affected workers and (disadvantaged) groups during reconstruction work Disadvantages? 
 Continue salary payment 
 Involve workers during rebuilding of the affected area 
 Take care of financial security 
Care for livestock 
 Care for livestock 
 Arrange stables for livestock (e.g. horses, poultry, cattle) 
 Set up animal shelters for pets 
 Arrange livestock food, water, medication 
 August 2007 
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Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
I  Reconstruction 
 
 Repair stations 
 
Communicate necessary renewing works to prevent disputes about wasting money and lack of attention to 
the ‘general public’ 
 
2.2 Temporary services 
Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
II  Temporary services 
 
Temporary utilities 
 Realise temporary utili ties 
 Temporary (potable) water supply (water storage, distribution, allocation points) 
 Temporary electricity supply (electrical generators) 
 Temporary gas supply 
 Realise temporary infrastructure for communication 
 Arrange information points (e.g. computer connections, flyers/posters with information) 
 Arrange press centre 
 
Set up temporary communication network (phone booths, phone exchange, aerial tower, e-mail, text 
messaging) 
 Arrange equipment for public announcements 
 
Make available cheap emergency mobile phones (HUGE assumption that cellphone towers still 
operational…) 
 Arrange cell-broadcast 
 Set up website, radio station, phone and digital helpdesks focussing on reconstruction 
Temporary infrastructure 
 Realisation temporary infrastructure 
 Repair inaccessible roads (from large to small) (e.g. concrete slabs, asphalt, sand) 
 Temporary traffic plan: detour (emergency) infrastructure 
 Temporary transfer points for emergency supplies, including cranes, loading bays 
Emergency repair flood protection system 
 Emergency repair flood protection system 
 Repair primary flood defences (before the next storm season) 
 Repair civil infrastructure 
Psychosocial care  
 
Set up information and advice centres.  
Provide the opportunity to ask questions (hotlines, information sessions) 
 
Communicate intended duration of temporary facilities and what the occupants can expect (e.g. related to 
safety) 
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Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
IV  Remediation management 
 
Stabilise the process of reconstruction activities 
 Spatial planning 
 Spatial planning of the area 
 City planning and design 
 Appoint contractors 
 Allocate permits  
 Allocate permits 
Financial security of reconstruction work 
 Organise f inances 
 Keep personnel employed 
 Increase (government) investments 
 Ensure sufficient financial support of local governments  
 Appeal to gain sufficient funds and means 
 Organise f inancial efficiency 
 Integrity 
 Fraud prevention reconstruction funds 
 Public reporting  
 Independent third party audits of reconstruction funds 
Finance victims 
 Support local businesses to  quickly  ‘get back to  business’ 
 Loans and financial support 
 Stimulate collaboration projects 
 Companies using dangerous substances deserve extra attention 
 Priority/preferential regulations for local economy 
 Financial procedures of  damage claims from civilians/companies 
 Clarify costs of reconstruction between civilians and government 
 Establish what governmental and emergency funding is available 
 Obtain expert damage assessment for agriculture/buildings/companies 
 Damage compensation by federal government / Insurance  
 Announce compensation regulations as soon as possible 
 Wait with damage assessment until all damage is accounted for 
 Contact public groups that are jointly requesting damage compensation 
Administration  
 Organise administration structure 
 Construct registration system of victims and companies 
 Maintain registration system 
 Map high-risk companies  
 Organise reporting standards and archive system for future research 
Supervise  
 Supervise building 
 Building restrictions 
 Supervise environment 
 August 2007 
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Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
III  Shelter of vic t ims 
 
Psychosocial care  
 
Early stage psychosocial intervention: supporting context (practical, emotional and social support); short 
instructions; psychological triage  
 Examine per individual: recuperative abilities, assignation of blame and participation in social networks 
 Special attention to elderly and (ex-)psychiatric patients 
 
2.4 Remediat ion management 
Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
IV  Remediation management 
 
Remediation management 
 Establish remediation management 
 Assemble remediation management framework 
 Political decisions, priorities 
 Make use of experiences from past disasters 
Public order and safety 
 Maintain order in disaster area 
 Command centres in/near affected area 
 Arrange local/regional (military/police) stations 
 Enclose and guard disaster area 
 Secure convoys of reconstruction/aide workers 
 Administration (registration) and identification 
 Remove stray/wild animals (spreading of disease, aggressive behaviour) 
 Inform populace about danger and threat in the area 
Maintain continuous reconstruction activities 
 Care for reconstruction/aide/service workers 
 Accommodate and provide food to aide workers 
 Make available logistic material for aide workers (transport) 
 Set up disinfection stations for workers in the area in case of chemical or biological pollution 
 Arrange equipment for individuals 
 Contact with and care for relatives of care/service workers 
 Maintain equipment used during reconstruction 
 Available equipment from government, rebuilding- and care services 
 Use low cost equipment 
 Set up equipment depots 
Information & advice centre 
 Set up walk-in centre where victims can reach all supporting/aid organisations  
 Important role in providing instructions, risk- and crisis-communication ??? 
 Determine and communicate end of aftercare phase  
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Trajectory and 
Category 
Measures and activit ies 
IV  Remediation management 
 
 Monitor dangerous substances (silt, air, vegetation, earth, water) 
 Supervise safety 
 Keep high-risk areas free of building works 
 Supervise public health 
 Monitor public health 
 Psychiatric aftercare 
Regime  
 Compose building regime 
 Compose rebuilding plans 
 Instigate building program 
 Maintain a strategic vision 
 Direct economical development, e.g. other production, change type of agriculture 
 Consider possibility to move companies into or out of flooded area 
 Compose regime for water, environment and safety 
 Adapt spatial planning regime according to flood risk 
 Consider flood resistant buildings 
 River management  
 Support/follow public initiatives 
 Compose regime for public  aftercare  
Research  
 Research water, space and safety 
 Examine care of flood defences 
 Indicate clear cause of flooding 
 Research river management 
 Research prevention of damage and casualties 
 Research lay-out or modification of crisis management 
 Research into future regional planning 
 Research cause and effect of disaster and announce results openly  
Inform 
 Inform about factual events 
 Inform why certain decisions were (not) made preceding the disaster 
 Teach the public a realistic sense of safety 
 Reiterate (new) threat 
 Acknowledge the fear of the general public and aim to inform about this 
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Newsletters 
The second 
partnermeeting of 
Chain of Safety in 
Husum (Germany) 
was a succes. 
All partners were very 
committed to the subject 
and enthusiastic to work 
together. At the end of this partnermeeting the working committees 
came up with a plan of action and based on that a timetable was 
made. Transnational workshops will be held during the projectperiod 
and a fi nal exercise will be organised to see 
if all theoretical ideas can be implemented in 
practice. 
The steering committee agreed with the set in 
direction of the working committees, as well 
as with their plans of action. The chairman was 
satisfi ed with the results of these two days of 
hard work.
news
       The project 
Chain of Safety has   
   made a good start!
Chain of Safety
  
The aim of the project Chain of Safety is to facilitate 
cooperation, exchange of experience and mutual 
assistance between North Sea Regions in the event of 
coastal fl ooding. 
Since fl ooding disasters do not stop at local, regional or even national 
borders, and neither do the effects of such disasters, transnational 
cooperation in contingency planning is very important. Although the 
actual approaches are comparable, different structures and cultural 
differences make that interregional cooperation on proaction, 
prevention, preparation, response and aftercare, i.e. the chain of 
safety is not always uniform. 
The European member states and the European Commission are 
developing initiatives and strategies covering the whole of the chain 
of safety. One of the objectives of the Chain of Safety project is 
to provide input and recommendations to the European discussion 
regarding this fi eld, by exchanging knowledge and experience 
available within the partnership. This will minimise the casualties 
and damage caused by coastal fl ooding.
The overall objective of 
the project is to initiate 
a contingency plan for 
fl ooding covering the whole 
North Sea Area. This would 
be in cooperation with all 
relevant stakeholders, in 
order to combine best 
practices and experiences. 
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Interview with chairman Viek Verdult
Joining individual links to 
forge a strong chain
We are discussing the Chain of 
Safety project with Viek Verdult 
(Chairman of the Chain of Safety 
Steering Committee). Verdult is 
very pleased with the project’s 
fi rst partner meeting in Husum, 
Germany. He explains, “Two days of 
hard work proved that we can forge 
the chain we desire with which to 
tackle the problem of fl ooding in the 
North Sea area. People got to know 
each other better, which led to an exchange and a greater clarity of 
visions, points of view and ideas.”
International approach
Last year the European Union asked the Dutch province of Zeeland 
to start up a project aimed at clustering the initiatives of countries 
bordering the North Sea, on the theme of fl ooding caused by the 
sea. Verdult felt honoured by the request of the secretariat of the 
Interreg North Sea Region from Viborg in Denmark. He says, “During 
the international commemoration of the 1953 fl ooding disaster it 
became clear that all countries along the North Sea coastline had 
taken up the theme of the danger of such fl oods. To develop a clear 
picture the secretariat asked us to act as leading partner. The project 
was aimed at mapping what the individual countries have developed 
over the years. The assignment accordingly focused on gathering all 
knowledge developed by North Sea countries.”
Practical plans, procedures and the means to 
carry them out
“In addition to gathering this knowledge, our aim was also to 
unlock and exchange this information. History has taught us 
that seaborne fl oods don’t stop at a country’s borders. As good 
neighbours it is wise and necessary to know what each other’s 
plans and procedures for calamities are. This is the background to 
the desire to exchange and coordinate with each other our plans 
and procedures for dealing with serious fl oods. This project is also 
about improving our awareness of the importance of acquiring the 
means to provide effective aid in a fl ood’s aftermath. We think there 
is an international trend towards reducing the availability of civil and 
other equipment for tackling fl oods. So, all partners in this project 
will be facing substantial investments, and we think it is better 
to tackle this problem collectively. That approach will allow us to 
make internationally effi cient use of the investments”, according 
to Verdult.
Verdult realises full well that problems surrounding the required 
investment needed to develop the means to deal effectively with 
actual fl oods will not be solved during this project. That will require 
international agreements, costing more time to accomplish than 
is available during the Chain of Safety project, which lasts until 
2008. 
“In addition, we will be running fi eld tests at the conclusion of our 
project. Next to sharing knowledge, exchanging and coordinating 
plans and procedures, and raising awareness of the lack of means 
with which to supply aid, there is also room in our project for a 
practical exercise. It will assess whether everything that has been 
put down on paper also works in practice,” explains the chairman.
Husum 
“The fi rst partner meeting was a huge success. We were for example 
able to address clearly the international aspect of the issue. We also 
came to the conclusion that there are several other regions that should 
be involved in the project. These regions include the Belgian province 
of Antwerp, and Norfolk in England. And we should also consider 
neighbouring North Sea countries. The Scandinavian countries do not 
directly face the danger of fl ooding, however it would be wise to agree 
on plans and procedures regarding calamities. We are assessing the 
possibilities to let other countries take part in this project as 
observers. We are working out the details. It should be more 
clear during the next partner meeting in Belgium in March 
2007,” Verdult indicates. 
Strong chain
He continues, “2007 is the year a lot of the work on the 
project is to be done. Husum showed us that we all realise 
that living with a water threat is an important issue that 
impacts all the countries. The results of the efforts will be 
seen during the exercises and the fi nal conference in 2008. 
Then we will be able to show how strong the chain of safety 
is. Looking at everybody’s intentions and enthusiasm I expect 
it to be very strong.”
Organisation
To implement all the necessary activities four Working 
Committees, a Project Management Team and a Steering 
Committee is formed.
The structure of the project is such that all partners will be involved 
in all activities of the project. Therefore, the activities will be carried 
out in all participating regions. An exception will be made for the 
pilot action, which will take place in the Belgium-Netherlands costal 
zone. The results however will be discussed with all partners and the 
outcomes should be useful for the other coastal regions in the North 
Sea area.
A responsible partner 
with recognised expertise 
will chair each working 
committee. Detailed 
organisation of activities 
within each component 
will be the responsibility 
of this chair, but will be 
discussed in the Steering 
Committee, to guarantee 
coherence. The chairmen of the working committees will provide the 
input for the periodic reports on activities to the Lead Partner.
More information about this? Visit www.chainofsafety.com
Events
Meetings of the steering and working committees
• March 21st – 23rd 2007 (Belgium)
• October 3rd – 5th 2007 (UK)
• Transnational workshop 1 “Plans”  March 2007 
• Transnational workshop 1 “Knowledge” October 2007
• Transnational workshop 1 “Equipment” March 2007
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that seaborne fl oods don’t stop at a country’s borders. As good 
neighbours it is wise and necessary to know what each other’s 
plans and procedures for calamities are. This is the background to 
the desire to exchange and coordinate with each other our plans 
and procedures for dealing with serious fl oods. This project is also 
about improving our awareness of the importance of acquiring the 
means to provide effective aid in a fl ood’s aftermath. We think there 
is an international trend towards reducing the availability of civil and 
other equipment for tackling fl oods. So, all partners in this project 
will be facing substantial investments, and we think it is better 
to tackle this problem collectively. That approach will allow us to 
make internationally effi cient use of the investments”, according 
to Verdult.
Verdult realises full well that problems surrounding the required 
investment needed to develop the means to deal effectively with 
actual fl oods will not be solved during this project. That will require 
international agreements, costing more time to accomplish than 
is available during the Chain of Safety project, which lasts until 
2008. 
“In addition, we will be running fi eld tests at the conclusion of our 
project. Next to sharing knowledge, exchanging and coordinating 
plans and procedures, and raising awareness of the lack of means 
with which to supply aid, there is also room in our project for a 
practical exercise. It will assess whether everything that has been 
put down on paper also works in practice,” explains the chairman.
Husum 
“The fi rst partner meeting was a huge success. We were for example 
able to address clearly the international aspect of the issue. We also 
came to the conclusion that there are several other regions that should 
be involved in the project. These regions include the Belgian province 
of Antwerp, and Norfolk in England. And we should also consider 
neighbouring North Sea countries. The Scandinavian countries do not 
directly face the danger of fl ooding, however it would be wise to agree 
on plans and procedures regarding calamities. We are assessing the 
possibilities to let other countries take part in this project as 
observers. We are working out the details. It should be more 
clear during the next partner meeting in Belgium in March 
2007,” Verdult indicates. 
Strong chain
He continues, “2007 is the year a lot of the work on the 
project is to be done. Husum showed us that we all realise 
that living with a water threat is an important issue that 
impacts all the countries. The results of the efforts will be 
seen during the exercises and the fi nal conference in 2008. 
Then we will be able to show how strong the chain of safety 
is. Looking at everybody’s intentions and enthusiasm I expect 
it to be very strong.”
Organisation
To implement all the necessary activities four Working 
Committees, a Project Management Team and a Steering 
Committee is formed.
The structure of the project is such that all partners will be involved 
in all activities of the project. Therefore, the activities will be carried 
out in all participating regions. An exception will be made for the 
pilot action, which will take place in the Belgium-Netherlands costal 
zone. The results however will be discussed with all partners and the 
outcomes should be useful for the other coastal regions in the North 
Sea area.
A responsible partner 
with recognised expertise 
will chair each working 
committee. Detailed 
organisation of activities 
within each component 
will be the responsibility 
of this chair, but will be 
discussed in the Steering 
Committee, to guarantee 
coherence. The chairmen of the working committees will provide the 
input for the periodic reports on activities to the Lead Partner.
More information about this? Visit www.chainofsafety.com
Events
Meetings of the steering and working committees
• March 21st – 23rd 2007 (Belgium)
• October 3rd – 5th 2007 (UK)
• Transnational workshop 1 “Plans”  March 2007 
• Transnational workshop 1 “Knowledge” October 2007
• Transnational workshop 1 “Equipment” March 2007
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Events
Meetings of the steering committee and 
the working committees
•   October 3rd – 5th 2007 (UK)
•   January 23rd – 25th 2008 (Denmark)
Workshops
•   Transnational workshop 1 “Knowledge” October 2007
•   Transnational workshop 2 “Plans” January 2008
•   Transnational workshop 2 “Knowledge” January 2008
•   Transnational workshop 2 “Equipment” January 2008
•   Exercise “Pilot” May 2008
Final conference
•   May 2008 (Netherlands)
Contact
Contact information
The Province of Zeeland (The Netherlands) is the project’s 
Leading Partner.
For questions / remarks please turn to the Project Leader, 
Mr. R. de Meyer           or
r.de.meyer@zeeland.nl
 
Contactpersons of the project partners 
•  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (the 
Netherlands), 
Mrs. E. van Eijbergen
•  Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
the Netherlands) 
Mr. C. Goemans
•   Essex County Council (UK) 
Mrs. R. Briggs
•  Danish Coastal Authority (Denmark) 
Mr. J. Jensen
•   Ministry of the Interior of the Land Schleswig-Holstein (Germany)
Mr. M. Hamann
•  Flemish Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Belgium)
Mrs. T. Mertens
•   Province of East-Flanders (Belgium) 
Mr. L. Bauwens
•   Province of West-Flanders (Belgium) 
Mrs. C. Matthijs
•   Municipality Schouwen-Duiveland (the Netherlands) 
Mr. E. Caspers
•   Province of Antwerp (Belgium)
  Mr. F. Van Immerseel
Safer society
Knowing that working together along the lines of that principle will help in 
planning for a safer society, various partners of different member states 
around the North Sea Region initiated the project. The project partners 
now ﬁ nd themselves supported in this initiative because the safety chain 
has become one of the main principles in the EU Flood Directive which 
has very recently been accepted by the European Parliament. 
Why?
Why focus on a ﬂ ood contingency plan? Don’t we have a strong defence 
against the North Sea? Yes, we have! And we are safer than ever, 
but there is no 100% guarantee that ﬂ ooding will never, ever happen 
again. Following the safety chain, we know that we can perform better, 
especially regarding response preparedness. So, there is a paradigm 
shift moving from “defend and manage” to “anticipate and respond”. 
There is also a shift from “the government protects society from ﬂ oods” 
to clear choices about living with the risk and the roles of government 
and those of other actors. Information, communication, awareness-
raising and response planning become essential.
Cooperation
Besides the long tradition around the North Sea of ﬂ ood risk 
management and preventive measures, ﬂ ood incident management 
and ﬂ ood contingency plan development become essential too, though 
the latter is underexposed. Regarding these developments, the Chain 
of Safety project focuses on cross-border cooperation, knowledge 
exchange, organisational measures and further increase of standards 
for our initiative towards a ﬂ ood contingency plan to cover the entire 
North Sea Region. The spring meetings and workshops in Belgium 
and the equipment and plans resulted in an awareness of limited 
available regional and/or national resources and a table of contents 
for evacuation planning.
With this knowledge, the different ﬂ ood response procedures and plans 
can now be further harmonised and integrated in existing emergency 
response structures and plans. This project - with its focus on the 
response part of the safety chain and with the initiative 
towards a ﬂ ood contingency plan - will herewith 
become part of the process of implementing the EU 
Flood Directive. 
Corsmas Goemans, MSc; Bed
Chair Working Committee of Plans
Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the 
Netherlands
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In the small Belgium coastal town of Blankenberge the partners of the 
project Chain of Safety gathered from March 21st to 23rd 2007 for the 
second time. By means of this project an inventory is drawn up of: 
•   contingency plans with regard to coastal fl oodings 
•   the equipment in the different countries
•   the knowledge about coastal fl oodings and response
The fi nal goal is to make one transnational contingency plan. In May 2008 
the framework for this plan will be tested for the fi rst time on the basis of 
a border crossing incident between Belgium and the Netherlands.
Workshops
The meeting started Wednesday-afternoon with a couple of workshops, 
where experts from several countries in the fi eld of fl ooding were invited 
for. The chairmen of the working committees “Plans” and “Equipment” 
presented their results up to now to specialists from the Monitoring 
and Information Center (MIC) of the European Commission, the National 
Operational Coordination Center (LOCC) of the Dutch Ministry of Interior 
and Kingdom Relations, the Ministry of Transport, Public Works & Water 
Management, German and Belgium Ministries and asked them to give 
feedback. The chairmen of the working committees had prelimanary to 
this meeting held an inventory amongst the partners of the project. A 
vivid discussion arose, which led to surprising results for the continuation 
of the project.
Media invasion
The working committees gathered the second day and during these 
meetings the progress and the development were discussed. The 
outcomes of the workshops were involved in this too of course. Apart 
from that the order was 
properly disrupted  that day 
by a true media invasion. The 
West-Flemish television as well 
as radio and writing press had 
set out for the hotel for several 
interviews with the chairman 
of the steering committee and 
other partners of the project.  At the end of day 2 a visit was paid to the 
MRCC (Maritime Rescue and Coordination Center) in Ostend, the centre 
for calamities at sea.
Next time: Essex
The meeting of the steering committee was the order of the last day 
of the partnermeeting. As a result of all discussions during the past 
few days, it had became clear that the project would continue from a 
joint starting point in the form of a couple of scenario’s. Decided was 
to ask an external expert to work out these scenario’s, varying from a 
news
   2nd meeting in 
Blankenberge
regional incident with crossborder effects to the worst case scenario. 
These scenario’s don’t have to be worked out in detail but have to be able 
to serve as a basis to make a good risk and result-assessment.
At the end of this meeting all partners got the necessary homework for the 
next partnermeeting, which will be held in coming October in Essex (UK).
Flood Contingency Planning 
and the Safety Chain
Making contingency plans demands working together on various 
governmental levels and with various operational organisations.
As one of the partners in the Chain of Safety project, the Ministry of 
the Interior and Kingdom Relations of the 
Netherlands is a very natural one. In working 
together for a safe and secure society, the 
Dutch government has promoted the use of 
the principle of the chain of safety (pro-action, 
prevention, preparation, response and recovery) 
since the early 1990s --- within the domain of 
disaster relief and crisis management (civil protection).
Of great value is how the principle combines the safety efforts of the 
people in different operational and governmental organisations with the 
efforts of the public and business. Besides that, a balanced contribution 
can be made for all the links in that safety chain. 
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Events
Meetings of the steering committee and 
the working committees
•   January 23rd – 25th 2008 (Denmark)
Workshops
•   Transnational workshop 2 “Plans” January 2008
•   Transnational workshop 2 “Knowledge” January 2008
•   Transnational workshop 2 “Equipment” January 2008
•   Exercise “Pilot” May 2008
Final conference
•   21 & 22 May 2008 (Netherlands)
Contact
Contact information
The Province of Zeeland (The Netherlands) is the project’s 
Leading Partner.
For questions / remarks please turn to the Project Leader, 
Mr. R. de Meyer           or
r.de.meyer@zeeland.nl
 
Contactpersons of the project partners 
•  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (the 
Netherlands), 
Mrs. E. van Eijbergen
•  Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
the Netherlands) 
Mr. C. Goemans
•   Essex County Council (UK) 
Mrs. R. Briggs
•  Danish Coastal Authority (Denmark) 
Mr. J. Jensen
•   Ministry of the Interior of the Land Schleswig-Holstein (Germany)
Mr. M. Hamann
•  Flemish Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Belgium)
Mrs. T. Mertens
•   Province of East-Flanders (Belgium) 
Mr. L. Bauwens
•   Province of West-Flanders (Belgium) 
Mrs. C. Matthijs
•   Municipality Schouwen-Duiveland (the Netherlands) 
Mr. E. Caspers
•   Province of Antwerp (Belgium)
  Mr. F. Van Immerseel
These students, Dorina Damsa and Justin de Jager, were instructed to 
design and make a start with ﬁ lling the database. They both were very 
enthusiastically and worked hard to get this result.
This database should be considered as a ﬁ rst step towards a more 
comprehensive knowledge database. You can ﬁ nd the database on our 
website www.chainofsafety.com
Why looking across the 
borders?
Schleswig-Holstein is the northern most state in Germany. It is the 
state between the two seas and has as such a natural, vital interest 
in safeguarding people living at the coast. 25 % of its area is ﬂ ood 
prone by both the North Sea and the Baltic Sea, with the North Sea 
coastal lowlands representing the biggest part. Although there is a 
long tradition in coastal ﬂ ood defence and disaster management, for 
a small state like ours it is essential to look across the borders and 
work together with our neighbours. However, cooperation and looking 
across the border should not only be understood in geographic terms 
but also in the sense of interdisciplinary cooperation. The principle of 
the chain of safety covers this approach, which has – this evolved in 
many discussions – to be put into practise much more in the future. 
The sectoral view still is the usual way of thinking in many operational 
and governmental organisations.
Projects like “Chain of Safety” are thus - besides their original purpose 
to facilitate exchange of experience - a good opportunity to get in touch 
with people of various professions, backgrounds and responsibilities. 
This helps to get a wider horizon and develop a holistic view, which is 
essential to solve problems in a world that is getting more and more 
complex.
Equipment 
A policy study showed that the countries around the North Sea all have 
their own way of prioritising different parts of the safety chain, but in 
most countries preparation and response play a big role in coastal 
risk management. Making a plan for a worst case ﬂ ood that affects 
more than one region means also to evaluate the existing equipment. 
A ﬁ rst, very rough assessment showed that in most cases there will 
be enough equipment to ﬁ ght a severe food. However, the problem 
could be to get in time to the place where it is needed. Although the 
mechanisms and structures to assist with physical equipment and 
manpower are well developed on the different levels, still these have to 
be worked out in practise. For instance, if you ask your neighbours for 
assistance, you should deﬁ ne your needs as precisely as possible. A 
common checklist or a kind of catalogue is now being worked out and 
will become a part of an interregional ﬂ ood contingency plan.
Matthias Hamann
Chain Working Committee of Equipment
Ministry of Interior of the Land Schleswig-
Holstein (Germany)
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Visit www.chainofsafety.com
At the beginning of October 2007 in Essex (UK), the partners in the 
Chain of Safety assessed the project set up in 2006 and which is set 
to be concluded in the spring of next year. The question that was to be 
answered in the United Kingdom was which advances had been made 
in the process of cooperation and exchange of knowledge in case of 
coastal flooding.
In the meantime, a couple of scenarios, varying from a serious threat of a 
levee breach in the short term to an actual breach in one or more areas, 
have been developed. The project’s four working groups thus have a 
common starting point and are able to further conduct their activities. 
In the working group ‘Plans’ an inventarisation has taken place of existing 
plans in the participating countries and how they are related to the links 
in the chain of safety. An agreement has been made to create a sort of 
masterplan, taking up the scenarios and the inventarisation. Part of the 
plan will be a matrix including a timeline and related actions. The working 
group ‘Equipment’ will follow up on this by producing a guideline for the 
deployment of equipment. The guideline seeks to provide an overview 
of the equipment that is necessary and how its deployment should be 
prioritized 
 
Database
The working group ‘Knowledge’ is one step further. With the help of 
enthousiastic students of the Roosevelt Academy in Middelburg, and 
with the support of the cluster Digital Media of the province of Zeeland, 
an online database has been realized. The program constitutes a first 
step in the direction of a virtual network of coastal floodings which will 
eventually be housed in a knowledge centre. Further elaboration will be 
addressed in the next partner-meeting.
Preparations for the cross-border exercise between the Netherlands and 
Belgium are in full swing in the working group ‘Pilot’. A first outline for 
the cross-border plan has been produced on the basis of the European 
ESCAPE-project. This outline will be used during the exercise. Further 
elaboration in the framework for a transnational contigency plan is the 
responsibility of the ‘Plans’-working group.
The idea of presenting documents in a public accessible database came 
into existence after an agreement was made on the significance of 
collecting expertise and knowledge on coastal flooding. The reasoning 
behind it was that mutual exchange of knowledge would also benefit 
cooperation, which is also one of the main ideas behind this project. It 
is important that knowledge is made available for everyone in need for 
it. Bearing in mind that the information had to be publicly, easily and 
quickly accessible, it was not that hard to come up with the suggestion 
to make use of the Internet.
The database primarily focuses on the shackles “preparation” and 
“response”, which are in line with the focus of the project Chain of 
Safety. 
Finally, the description and contact information of relevant websites and 
academics are an addition to the database.
The preparation for the build-up of the database has been done by 
means of a questionnaire, where all the partners could add relevant 
documents by dividing them by shackle of the safety chain.
The analysis and processing of the documents were outsourced. 
Therefore, two students from the Roosevelt Academy, the university of 
Middelburg, were hired because of their international focus. 
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Events
Workshops
t Exercise “Pilot”  19 and 20 May 
  2008 (Belgium/Netherlands)
Final conference
t 21 & 22 May 2008 (Netherlands)
Contact
Contact information
The Province of Zeeland (The Netherlands) is the project’s 
Leading Partner.
For questions / remarks please turn to the Project Leader, 
Mr. R. de Meyer           or
r.de.meyer@zeeland.nl
 
Contactpersons of the project partners 
t  Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management (the 
Netherlands), 
Mrs. E. van Eijbergen
t  Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations 
the Netherlands) 
Mr. C. Goemans
t   Essex County Council (UK) 
Mrs. R. Briggs
t Danish Coastal Authority (Denmark) 
Mr. J. Jensen
t  Ministry of the Interior of the Land Schleswig-Holstein (Germany)
Mr. M. Hamann
tFlemish Ministry of Transport and Public Works (Belgium)
Mrs. T. Mertens
t Province of East-Flanders (Belgium) 
Mr. L. Bauwens
t Province of West-Flanders (Belgium) 
Mrs. C. Matthijs
t Municipality Schouwen-Duiveland (the Netherlands) 
Mr. E. Caspers
t Province of Antwerp (Belgium)
  Mr. F. Van Immerseel
Mutual cooperation is 
  of the essence for successful
  transnational contingency planning 
      and implementation.
Cross-border cooperation
All coastal regions in the North Sea Region have their own knowledge 
and experience with contingency planning and disaster relief in relation 
to coastal fl ooding. Since regional or national borders do not limit 
the effects of a disaster, risk and crisis management should also be 
approached from a cross-border viewpoint.
Therefore, some countries have worked out bilateral agreements, 
for example Belgium and The Netherlands, to guarantee mutual aid 
in combating accidents and disasters, but these are only the fi rst 
steps towards cross-border disaster management: there is a need for 
transnational contingency planning.
Chain of Safety wants to make a contribution by working out a 
contingency plan structure for fl ooding which should cover the whole 
North Sea Region.  This structure is to be set up from the North Sea 
Region perspective and to be based on the Dutch model of the chain of 
safety.  Every plan has to start small, though ...
Pilot area
A transnational framework for contingency planning has already been 
worked out in the European project ESCAPE and is used as a basis for 
Chain of Safety. Its main aim is to establish the fi rst steps towards a 
joint contingency plan for fl oods in low lying bordering regions.  Mutual 
cooperation is of the essence for successful contingency planning and 
implementation. Initiating a contingency plan on a common base will 
heighten its quality and provide the possibility for sharing equipment, 
resources, knowledge and experience. In the Dutch-Belgian coastal 
region a pilot site has been designated, being the coastline between 
Zeebrugge (Belgium) and Breskens (The Netherlands). All knowledge and 
relevant information for this pilot area is being collected bearing a worst 
case scenario in mind: affected area, technical information, responsible 
authorities, available infrastructure, …
The fi nal product has to be seen as an addition to all existing plans 
and agreements – rather than a stand-alone document - and will form a 
practical guideline to use in the case of cross-border coastal fl ooding. 
To test the practical use of this document a virtual exercise will take place 
on May, 19-20th as a pre-phase of the fi nal conference in Scheveningen. 
Three teams are going to work separately: a Belgian crisis centre at 
Oostende, a Dutch crisis centre at Middelburg and the command centre 
at Zele.  The main aim of the exercise is to train the communication 
between centres, in terms of coordination and the quality of decision-
making. All partners will be involved in this exercise and some will act as 
observers to evaluate its results. Their key fi ndings will be presented at 
the fi nal conference on May, 21-22nd. The pilot coastal contingency plan 
will serve as a fi rst step and a learning exercise preparing for a future 
North Sea contingency plan in cross-border areas.  
Tina Mertens
Chair Working Committee Pilot
Flemish Ministry of Transport 
and Public Works (Belgium)
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A lot of experts were present in Denmark 
From January 23rd to January 25th the partners of Chain of Safety 
gathered in Ribe, Denmark.
It was going to be a busy program: 2 workshops and 4 meetings of 
the working committees and steering committee were scheduled during 
these 3 days. A lot of experts were present to attend the workshops 
“Plans & Equipment” and “Knowledge”. Good input was given and 
helped the project partners further with optimizing their fi nal report and 
formulating the project’s recommendations. A combined draft report is 
currently drawn up which will give a good insight of the framework in 
which the project operated, the working process of the project as well 
as the considerations that are behind the recommendations made by 
the project.
Furthermore the project partners spoke about the proposal to initiate 
a Knowledge Centre on Crisismanagement of Coastal Flooding and 
discussed the possibilities of an initiative for a transnational contingency 
plan on coastal fl ooding. Related to the latter, also the Pilot-exercise 
came up. This exercise will be held on May 19 and 20, 2008 to practice 
cross-border (Belgium and the Netherlands) the arrangements that are 
made in the initiative for a transnational contingency plan on coastal 
fl ooding as mentioned above.
Finally the project partners were informed about the preparations 
that were already made for the combined fi nal conference. The fi nal 
conference is organized together with the Interreg project Safecoast 
and will be held on May 21 and 22, 2008.
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Registration online, go to 
www.congrespagina.nl/riskmeetscrisis
RISK meets CRISIS
risk management mee
ts crisis management
 on coastal flooding
INVITATION
MAY 21-22, 2008
CARLTON BEACH HOT
EL, SCHEVENINGEN, T
HE NETHERLANDS
INFORMATION
risk management mee
ts crisis management
 on coastal flooding
Conference Location
Carlton Beach Hotel
Gevers Deynootweg 201
2586 HZ SCHEVENINGEN - The Hague
www.carlton.nl
Language
The ocial language is English.
Registration
You can register via the webpages ww
w.safecoast.org or www.chainofsafet
y.com
Early registration 2 days including hot
el (register before May 1)   E
UR 200,-
Late registration 2 days including hote
l ( register after May 1)  EU
R 250,-
Only May 21   
    EUR  
 50,-
Only May 22   
    EUR  
 75,-
Cancellation
Notication of cancellation must be
 done in writing to the conference 
secretariat. In case of 
cancellation before May 7, 2008, you 
will be charged EUR 15,- for administ
ration costs. In case of 
cancellation after May 7, 2008, the ful
l registration fee will be charged. 
 
Hotel accommodation
You can make a hotel reservation for
 the Carlton Beach Hotel using the re
gistration form on the 
internet. In case of cancellation of the
 hotel, the hotel’s cancellation policy w
ill be applied.
address
risk management mee
ts crisis management
 on coastal flooding
Secretariat
VCP Congressen
Ms. Linda van Maasakker (project man
ager)
P.O. Box 113
5660 AC GELDROP
T: +31 (0)40 – 280 27 50 
F: +31 (0)40 – 285 19 66
E: Linda@vcpcongressen.nl
Final 
conference 
“Risk 
  meets 
 Crisis”
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